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TERMINATION OF COLLEGE COACHING
CONTRACTS: WHEN DOES ADEQUATE CAUSE
TO TERMINATE EXIST AND WHO
DETERMINES ITS EXISTENCE?
MARTIN J. GREENBERG*
I. INTRODUCTION: JIM O'BRIEN'S BACKGROUND'
Jim O'Brien arrived on the campus of The Ohio State University (OSU) in
the spring of 1997.2 O'Brien was hired as OSU's head men's basketball coach
on April 12, 1997. 3 He came to OSU with over twenty years of experience
coaching basketball at the collegiate level.4 O'Brien's college coaching career
began in 1977 as an assistant at the University of Connecticut. 5 After five
years as an assistant at Connecticut, O'Brien got his first head coaching
position at St. Bonaventure University. 6 He coached at St. Bonaventure from
1982 to 1986 before moving on to Boston College, where he served as head
coach from 1986 to 1997. 7
* Managing member of Greenberg & Hoeschen, LLC, a law firm concentrating in the areas of
real estate and sports law; Adjunct Professor of law at Marquette University Law School; Chairman
of the Board of the Wisconsin State Fair Park, Wisconsin Exposition Center, Wisconsin Sports
Development Corporation and Wisconsin Athletic Hall of Fame.
Jay S. Smith, a third-year law student, who graduated from the University of Wisconsin - La
Crosse and is a NSLI Sports Law Certificate candidate, has been instrumental in the draffing and
research of this article. Without his contribution, his dedication to detail and extraordinary effort, this
article would not have been possible.
This article is dedicated to the staff of Wisconsin State Fair Park, who over the last four years
under my chairmanship, has taken a troubled state asset and turned it around into a profitable venture,
has saved one of the best state fairs in the country from being bankrupted, and has given Wisconsin
State Fair Park a new hope for the future.
1. Note that O'Brien's records and the achievements of OSU listed in this section do not reflect
changes that occurred when the NCAA erased all of OSU's records from 1999-2002.
2. O'Brien v. The Ohio State Univ., 2006-Ohio-1 104, 2006 Ohio Misc. LEXIS 52, 2 (Ohio Ct.
Cl. Feb. 12, 2006).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Jim O'Brien Profile, OHIOSTATEBUCKEYES.COM, http://ohiostatebuckeyes.cstv.com/sports/m-
baskbl/mtt/obrienjim0l.html (last visited May 27, 2006).
6. Id.
7. Id.
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After eleven successful seasons at Boston College, OSU hired O'Brien.8
O'Brien quickly found success at OSU, leading the team to the Final Four in
1999.9  O'Brien also led the program to Big Ten regular season co-
championships in 2000 and 2002 and the Big Ten Tournament Championship
in 2002.10 Under O'Brien, OSU made a school record four consecutive
National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) tournament appearances
from 1999 to 2002.11 Due to the success of his team, O'Brien also received
several individual honors for his coaching. 12 Following OSU's Final Four run
in 1999, O'Brien received numerous National Coach of the Year honors.13 He
was also selected by the Big Ten media as the Big Ten Coach of the Year in
1999 and 2001.14
In twenty-one seasons as a head coach, Jim O'Brien accumulated a 354-
289 win-loss record. 15 His record in six seasons at OSU was 119-72.16
O'Brien-coached teams have participated in the NCAA tournament on seven
occasions and in the postseason NIT tournament five times. 1
7
II. EVENTS SURROUNDING JIM O'BRIEN'S TERMINATION
Despite O'Brien's success as the OSU men's basketball coach, OSU
terminated O'Brien's employment on June 8, 2004.18 O'Brien's dismissal was
the result of events that began in 1998.19 The series of events that led to
O'Brien's firing began when Aleksandar Radojevic arrived on the campus of
OSU for an unofficial recruiting visit on May 14, 1998.20 Radojevic, a 7'3"
player from Yugoslavia, was twenty-one years old at the time.21 At the time
of his visit, Radojevic was enrolled at Barton Community College in Kansas
8. Id.
9. P1.'s Compl. 9, O'Brien v. The Ohio State Univ., 2006-Ohio- 1104, 2006 Ohio Misc. LEXIS
52 (Ohio Ct. C1. Feb. 12, 2006) (No. 2004-10230).
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id,
14, Id.
15. Jim O'Brien Profile, supra note 5.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. O'Brien v. The Ohio State Univ., 2006-Ohio- 1104, 2006 Ohio Misc. LEXIS 52, 26-27
(Ohio Ct. CI. Feb. 12, 2006).
19. See id. 4.
20. See id.
21. Id.
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and played on the basketball team at Barton.22 Radojevic was planning to
transfer to a four-year school, and OSU was one of many schools that was
recruiting him.23
In early September of 1998, O'Brien made an official recruiting visit to
Radojevic at Barton.24 While O'Brien was on the visit, Radojevic received
word that his father had passed away in Yugoslavia. 25 Radojevic was upset
about his father's death and expressed to O'Brien his "concern for his mother
who was living in a war-tom region of Yugoslavia." 26 Radojevic also told
O'Brien he regretted being unable to provide financial assistance to his
mother.27 Radojevic felt he could not return to Yugoslavia to help his mother
because he feared that he would be forced into military service. 28
Within a few weeks of his visit to Barton, O'Brien learned that in 1996
Radojevic had signed a contract to play basketball for a professional team in
Yugoslavia and had received compensation for his play.29 Based on this
information, O'Brien determined that Radojevic was a professional basketball
player, and therefore, was ineligible to play college basketball. 30 Despite
knowing this information, O'Brien and his staff continued to recruit
Radojevic. 31 On November 11, 1998, Radojevic signed a National Letter of
Intent to play for OSU. 32
On December 13, 1998, Radojevic went to OSU for an official visit.33
Around the time of the visit or shortly thereafter, O'Brien was asked to
provide financial assistance to the Radojevic family. 34 The request originated
from a man named Spomenko Patrovic who lived in New York City.35 The
details of the request and Patrovic's relationship to Radojevic are unclear;
however, it appears that Patrovic was either Radojevic's relative or his legal
guardian. 36 Regardless of these details, in late December of 1998 or early
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. 5.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. 6.
30. Id.
31. Id. 7.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. 8-9.
35. Id. 9.
36. Id.
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January of 1999 O'Brien took $6000 in cash from his desk, placed it in an
envelope, and instructed an assistant coach to deliver the money to Patrovic. 37
Patrovic was to forward the money on to the Radojevic family in
Yugoslavia.38
O'Brien characterized the money as a loan, but there was no written loan
agreement or specified terms of repayment. 39  O'Brien claimed that he
believed the loan did not violate NCAA rules because Radojevic was already a
professional basketball player and lending money to the family of a
professional basketball player is not prohibited by NCAA rules.40 O'Brien
also claimed that the Radojevic family's situation was his motivation for the
loan, not Aleksandar Radojevic's potential as a basketball player.4'
In February of 1999, the NCAA informed OSU that Radojevic had signed
a professional basketball contract in 1996.42 OSU immediately declared
Radojevic ineligible and applied to the NCAA for Radojevic's reinstatement
as an amateur.43 The application was denied, and, on May 24, 1999, OSU's
appeal of the decision was denied.44 Radojevic never enrolled at OSU or
played basketball for the university. 45 In the summer of 1999, Radojevic
entered the National Basketball Association (NBA) draft and was selected
twelfth overall by the Toronto Raptors. 46 On September 15, 1999, O'Brien
signed an NCAA Certificate of Compliance. 47 By signing the certificate,
O'Brien certified that during the 1998-99 academic year he had reported any
NCAA rules violations that he was aware of.48 While it is unclear if it was a
violation of NCAA rules, O'Brien did not report giving the money to the
Radojevic family.
The 1998-99 season was an extremely successful season for O'Brien and
his basketball team.49 The team earned a share of the Big Ten Conference title
and advanced to the Final Four in the NCAA tournament.50 Following the
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. 10.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. 11.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. 12.
46. Id.
47. Id. 13.
48. Id.
49. Id. 14.
50. Id.
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season, O'Brien won several coaching honors. 51 O'Brien was also rewarded
by OSU for his successful season. OSU initiated discussions with O'Brien
regarding a new contract. 52 O'Brien and OSU reached an agreement, which
took effect on September 12, 1999. 53 The new contract was clearly more
favorable to O'Brien than his original contract with the university. 54 The new
contract gave him an eight-year extension and significantly increased his
compensation. 55
Radojevic and the events of 1998 and 1999 seemed to be in the past for
O'Brien until the OSU spring football game on April 24, 2004.56 At the game,
O'Brien pulled OSU Athletic Director Andy Geiger aside and told him about
the money he had loaned to the Radojevic family.57 O'Brien explained to
Geiger that the loan would likely be revealed to the public in a lawsuit
involving a woman named Kathy Salyers. 58 O'Brien told Geiger he wanted
him to hear about the Radojevic loan from him personally. 59 O'Brien also
explained to Geiger that his motivation for providing the loan was purely to
help a family in need.60
In May of 2004, Geiger saw the deposition testimony from the Salyers
lawsuit.6 1 Following the spring football game, Geiger and O'Brien did not
51. Id.
52. Id. 15.
53. Id. 17.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. 18.
57. Id.
58. The lawsuit was filed by Salyers against OSU alumni boosters, Dan and Kim Rostovic in
August of 2003. Kathy Lynn Gray, Salyers: OSU Case Made Her an Outcast: NCAA Probe Hurt
Her, too, Whistle-Blower Says, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Mar. 27, 2006, at 01.A. Salyers claimed the
Rostovics had failed to pay her $1000 a month for housing Savovic. Id.; Aaron Portzline & Kathy
Lynn Gray, NCAA Outlines OSU's Failures, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, May 17, 2005, at 01.A. Salyers
had provided numerous impermissible benefits to former OSU player Slobodan Savovic, including
housing. Gray, supra note 58; Portzline & Gray, supra note 58. Salyers alleged that the Rostovics
promised to reimburse her for all of the costs she incurred related to Savovic. Gray, supra note 58;
Portzline & Gray, supra note 58. In her lawsuit, Salyers claimed she was owed $600,000. Gray,
supra note 58; Portzline & Gray, supra note 58. Salyers and the Rostovics settled the lawsuit, but the
terms of the settlement were not disclosed. Gray, supra note 58; Portzline & Gray, supra note 58.
Savovic, also from Yugoslavia, and Salyers had contact with Radojevic during the recruiting process.
Gray, supra note 58; Portzline & Gray, supra note 58. O'Brien feared the Radojevic loan would be
revealed during the lawsuit. See Gray, supra note 58; Portzline & Gray, supra note 58. The violations
involving Savovic were part of the NCAA investigation and the March 10, 2006 infractions report.
Joe LaPointe, Buckeyes Remain Eligible for NCAA Tournament, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2006, at D2.
59. O'Brien, 2006-Ohio-1104, Ohio Misc. LEXIS 52, 18.
60. Id.
61. Id. 20.
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speak to each other again until the Big Ten basketball meeting in Chicago
from May 18-20.62 At the meeting, they did not discuss the loan. 63 However,
on May 26, 2004, O'Brien, Geiger, and Julie Vanatta (OSU's legal counsel)
had a brief meeting in Columbus, Ohio.64 At the meeting, O'Brien was
informed that the loan had been reported to the NCAA and Geiger suggested
O'Brien hire an attorney. 65 The following day, O'Brien called Geiger and
asked him if he was going to be fired.66 According to O'Brien, Geiger told
him he was not going to be fired.67 O'Brien also offered to resign from his
position.68 A few days later, O'Brien informed OSU that he had hired
attorney James Zeszutec. 69 On June 4, 2004, Zeszutec sent a letter informing
OSU that he had been hired as O'Brien's attorney.70 OSU did not respond to
the letter.71
On the morning of June 8, 2004, O'Brien was summoned to a meeting at
Geiger's office. 72 At the meeting, Geiger gave O'Brien a letter notifying him
of OSU's intent to terminate him as the head coach of the men's basketball
team.73 The letter read:
As you know, you informed me on April 24, 2004, that you had paid
approximately six thousand dollars ($6,000) to Alex Radojevic, a
men's basketball prospective student-athlete. You admitted that you
gave him this money sometime after Mr. Radojevic signed his
National Letter of Intent to attend The Ohio State University
(November 11, 1998), but before May 24, 1999, the date that Mr.
Radojevic's request for reinstatement to the NCAA was denied by the
NCAA's Subcommittee on Student-Athlete Reinstatement. Although
you explained that you gave him the money to assist him with his
family's dire financial situation in light of the Serbian war, that
reason, however noble, does not excuse your action.
In our discussion on April 24, 2004, you admitted that you knew your
62. Id. 21.
63. Id.
64. Id. 22.
65. Id.
66. Id. 23.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. 24.
70. Id. 25.
71. Id.
72. Id. 26.
73. Id.
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action was a violation of NCAA rules, and you are correct. In
particular, it is a recruiting inducement in violation of NCAA Bylaw
13.2.1. Despite the fact that the University was no longer actively
recruiting Mr. Radojevic after he signed his National Letter of Intent,
he is considered a "prospect" according to NCAA rules until he
officially registers and enrolls in a minimum full-time program of
studies and attends classes for autumn quarter. Furthermore, for each
of the past five years, you violated NCAA Bylaw 30.3.5 which, by
your signature on the annual NCAA Certification of Compliance
form, requires you to confirm that you have self-reported your
knowledge of any NCAA violations. We have self-reported this matter
and other allegations related to the program to the NCAA.
Section 4.1 (d) of your employment agreement requires you to "know,
recognize and comply" with all applicable rules and regulations of the
NCAA and to "immediately report to the Director [of Athletics] and to
the Department of Athletics Compliance Office" if you have
"reasonable cause to believe that M person ... has violated... such
laws, policies, rules or regulations." You have materially breached this
important term of your contract.
Unfortunately, your admitted wrongdoings leave the University no
choice. Pursuant to Section 5.1 (a) of your employment agreement, we
intend to terminate such agreement for cause, effective at 5:00 p.m.
today, June 8, 2004. Rather than being terminatedfor cause, you may
choose to terminate your employment agreement (including your
Letter of Agreement regarding supplemental compensation for
appearing on radio and television programs, and for summer
basketball camps and miscellaneous bonuses and benefits) and resign
from your position as head men's basketball coach provided that you
agree to continue to cooperate fully with the University and the
NCAA in our investigation of issues related to the men's basketball
program. Under either scenario, the University has no obligation to
provide compensation or benefits (other than the availability of
continued health benefits) to you past the effective date of such
termination or resignation.
If you choose to resign, you may sign the statement below and return
this letter to me by 1:00 p.m. today. At 3:00 p.m. today, the University
has scheduled a press conference to explain these matters as the
University believes that it, and not another entity, should take the lead
to inform the public of this unfortunate news. The University will
announce your separation from the University at the press conference.
2006]
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If you have not resigned in the manner set forth in this letter by 1:00
p.m. today, then the University will announce that it will terminate
your employment agreement for cause and we will do so. If you have
resigned in the manner set forth in this letter by 1:00 p.m. today, then
the University will announce at its press conference that you have
resigned and that the University has accepted your resignation.
I deeply regret that we have come to this circumstance. After we have
celebrated so much success together, this is very hard.74
Later that morning, Zeszutec contacted Geiger's office in an attempt to
gain more time for O'Brien to consider his options. 75 Geiger refused the
request, and O'Brien's termination was announced the same afternoon. 76
The allegations of misdeeds involving Radojevic and Savovic resulted in
an NCAA investigation of OSU. The NCAA released its findings about OSU
in an infractions report on March 10, 2006, twenty-one months after O'Brien's
termination. 77 In the infractions report, the NCAA placed OSU on three years
of probation and levied numerous sanctions against OSU for its violations.78
The sanctions included erasing all of the OSU basketball team's records from
1999-2002.19 Erasing these records means OSU did not win any games from
1999-2002.80 OSU was also stripped of all its achievements during those
years, including the 1999 Final Four run, Big Ten regular season co-
championships in 2000 and 2002 and the Big Ten Tournament Championship
in 2002.81 Erasing the records means that OSU's and O'Brien's records have
been adjusted to reflect these changes. 82
OSU will also need to pay back approximately $800,000 of tournament
revenue the school received from 1999-2002.83 Additional penalties include a
public reprimand and a reduction in campus visits for recruits.84 However,
OSU was not banned from future postseason play and was not cited for a "lack
74. Letter from Andy Geiger, Dir. of Athletics, The Ohio State Univ., to James J. O'Brien, Head
Men's Basketball Coach, The Ohio State Univ. (June 8, 2004) (on file with author).
75. O'Brien, 2006-Ohio-1104, 2006 Ohio Misc. LEXIS 52,127.
76. Id.
77. LaPointe, supra note 58.
78. Id.
79. O'Brien v. The Ohio State Univ., 2006-Ohio-4346, 2006 Ohio Misc. LEXIS 129 (Ohio Ct.
Cl. Aug. 2, 2006), available at http://www.dispatch.com/2006/08/02/obrien.pdf.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. LaPointe, supra note 58.
84. Id.
[Vol. 17:1
TERMINATION OF COACHING CONTRACTS
of institutional control. '85 The NCAA also did not take any scholarships away
other than the two OSU had already voluntarily dropped.86
III. TERMINATION PROVISIONS OF O'BRIEN'S CONTRACT
The basis of O'Brien's lawsuit against OSU was that he believed there
was not "cause," as it was defined in his contract, for his termination.8 7
College basketball coaches' contracts usually contain separate "termination for
cause" and "termination without cause" provisions. Termination for cause
provisions provide for circumstances under which the university may
terminate the coach and in doing so, the university is relieved of its duty to
further provide the coach with compensation and benefits due under the
contract. Termination without cause provisions provide what the coach's
compensation will be if the university chooses to terminate the coach without
having cause. Dismissal of a coach for any reason other than those laid out in
the termination for cause provision will be a termination without cause.
Like most coaching contracts, O'Brien's contract with OSU contained
termination for cause and termination without cause provisions.88 Under
O'Brien's contract, OSU's ability to terminate O'Brien for cause was limited
to the occurrence of one or more of the following:
(a) a material breach of this agreement by Coach, which Coach fails to
remedy to OSU's reasonable satisfaction, within a reasonable time
period, not to exceed thirty (30) days, after receipt of a written notice
from Ohio [S]tate specifying the act(s), conduct or omission(s)
constituting such breach;
(b) a violation by Coach (or a violation by a men's basketball program
staff member about which Coach knew or should have known and did
not report to appropriate Ohio State personnel) of applicable law,
policy, rule or regulation of the NCAA or the Big Ten Conference
which leads to a "major" infraction investigation by the NCAA or the
Big Ten Conference and which results in a finding by the NCAA or
the Big Ten Conference of lack of institutional control over the men's
basketball program or which results in Ohio State being sanctioned by
the NCAA or the Big Ten Conference in one or more of the following
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. P.'s Compl. 29, O'Brien v. The Ohio State Univ., 2006-Ohio-1104, 2006 Ohio Misc.
LEXIS 52 (Ohio Ct. C1. 2006) (No. 2004-10230).
88. EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT BETWEEN THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY AND JAMES O'BRIEN §
5.1-.3 (July 1, 1999) [hereinafter O'BRIEN CONTRACT].
2006]
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ways:
(i) a reduction in the number of scholarships permitted to be
allocated;
(ii) a limitation on recruiting activities or reduction in the number
of evaluation days;
(iii) a reduction in the number of expense-paid, official recruiting
visits;
(iv)placement of the men's basketball program or Ohio State on
probation;
(v) being banned from NCAA post-season play for at least one
season;
(vi) being banned from regional or national television coverage
for at least one basketball season with a consequent loss by Ohio
State of television revenues for at least one basketball season; or
(c) any criminal conduct by Coach that constitutes moral turpitude or
any other improper conduct that, in Ohio State's reasonable judgment,
reflects adversely on Ohio State or its athletic programs. 89
OSU had cause to fire O'Brien only if one or more of these three
occurrences were to arise. The three broad occurrences covered by the
termination for cause provision were material breaches of contract in violation
of NCAA or Big Ten rules, which resulted in a sanction, and amounted to
conduct that constitutes moral turpitude or reflects adversely on OSU. College
basketball coaches' contracts often cover all three of these occurrences in a
termination for cause provision because they represent the major concerns
universities have about coaches' conduct.
The termination for cause provision of O'Brien's contract required OSU to
give O'Brien written notice of its intention to terminate his employment and to
specify the contractual provision upon which it was firing him.90 The contract
did not specify any required amount of notice. The contract also provided that
if terminating for cause, OSU had no obligation to provide any further
compensation to O'Brien as of the date of termination. 91
The termination without cause provision of O'Brien's contract provided
for substantial liquidated damages if OSU fired him without cause. He was to
receive twelve months of his base salary ($175,000) and his normal benefits. 92
89. Id. § 5.1.
90. Id. § 5.1.1.
91. Id. § 5.1.2.
92. Id. §§ 5.2-.3.
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The twelve months of salary and benefits was subject to a "set-off' provision,
whereby he would not be paid this compensation if he were employed in a
similar position during the twelve months following his dismissal.93 However,
O'Brien was under no duty to mitigate damages if his employment was
terminated after June 30, 2003.94 Additionally, if OSU terminated O'Brien
without cause, it owed him additional liquidated damages as compensation
"for the loss of collateral business opportunities." 95 This provision was to
provide O'Brien the bulk of his liquidated damages if OSU fired him without
cause. This provision stated that O'Brien would be paid "an amount equal to
three and one-half (3.5) times the product of (y) the Coach's then current base
salary . . .and (z) the number of years remaining under the term of this
agreement. 9 6 These additional damages were to be paid in one lump sum
within thirty days of O'Brien's termination.97 O'Brien's attorneys calculated
that he was owed $3,295,870 under this provision.98
O'Brien's contract also contained a "Termination by Coach" provision.99
The "Termination by Coach" provision in O'Brien's contract read as follows:
If Coach terminates this agreement before the conclusion of the 2004-
2005 basketball season, regardless of the number of extension years he
has earned pursuant to Section 3.4 of this agreement, Ohio State will
not be liable to pay Coach any compensation or damages of any kind.
If Coach terminates this agreement after the conclusion of the 2004-
2005 basketball season, regardless of the number of extension years he
has earned pursuant to Section 3.4 of this agreement, Ohio State shall
pay to Coach (on a monthly basis) Coach's monthly budgeted salary
for the balance of the contract term or for two (2) years, whichever is
lesser, and employee benefits paid by Ohio State to Ohio State's
senior administrative and professional employees as determined by
Ohio State's Board of Trustees, provided that Coach makes himself
available for mutually agreed-upon special projects on behalf of Ohio
State. Coach shall not unreasonably make himself unavailable. Ohio
State's obligation to pay such amount to Coach shall cease if Coach
accepts a comparable employment position (for example, media
93. Id. § 5.2(a).
94. Id. § 5.2(b).
95. Id. § 5.3.
96. Id. § 5.3(b).
97. Id. § 5.3.
98. Pl's Compl. 45, O'Brien v. The Ohio State Univ., 2006-Ohio-1 104, 2006 Ohio Misc.
LEXIS 52 (Ohio Ct. CI. 2006) (No. 2004-10230).
99. O'BRiEN CONTRACT, supra note 88, § 5.4.
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commentator, professional head basketball coach or NCAA Division I
head basketball coach).100
IV. PLEADINGS OF THE CASE
Following his termination in June of 2004, O'Brien filed a lawsuit against
OSU alleging that OSU did not have cause to terminate him under Section 5.1
of his contract.101 When OSU dismissed O'Brien, it asserted it had cause to
fire him under Section 5.1(a) of the contract. 10 2 OSU contended it had cause
under this provision because O'Brien had committed a "material breach" of
his contract.10 3 In its letter notifying O'Brien of his termination, OSU alleged
that O'Brien had breached Section 4.1(d) of the employment agreement. 10 4
This provision required O'Brien to know and comply with the rules and
regulations of OSU, the NCAA and the Big Ten Conference. 10 5 It also
required O'Brien to report to the proper OSU authorities any violation that he
had reasonable cause to believe had occurred. 10 6 OSU claimed O'Brien's loan
to the Radojevic family was a violation of NCAA bylaws, and therefore, by
committing this violation, O'Brien had breached Section 4.1(d) of his
contract. 107
O'Brien contended that OSU did not have cause to terminate him "for
cause" under Section 5.1 (a) because this section of the employment agreement
does not apply to alleged or actual violations of NCAA bylaws. 10 8 O'Brien
claimed that the alleged and actual NCAA violations are addressed in Section
5.1(b). 10 9 O'Brien asserted that Section 5.1(b) defines when a violation of
NCAA Bylaws will constitute a material breach and therefore will justify a
"for cause" termination. 110  O'Brien contended that his actions did not
constitute a material breach under Section 5.1 (b) because this section requires
100. Id.
101. Pl.'s Compl. 30-32, O'Brien, 2006-Ohio-1104, 2006 Ohio Misc. LEXIS 52 (No. 2004-
10230).
102. Letter from Andy Geiger, Dir. of Athletics, The Ohio State Univ., to James J. O'Brien,
Head Men's Basketball Coach, The Ohio State Univ., supra note 74.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. O'BRIEN CONTRACT, supra note 88, § 4.1(d).
106. Id.
107. Letter from Andy Geiger, Dir. of Athletics, The Ohio State Univ., to James J. O'Brien,
Head Men's Basketball Coach, The Ohio State Univ., supra note 74.
108. Pl.'s Compl. 32, O'Brien v. The Ohio State Univ., 2006-Ohio-i 104, 2006 Ohio Misc.
LEXIS 52 (Ohio Ct. Cl. 2006) (No. 2004-10230).
109. Id. 33-34.
110. Id. 34.
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that the alleged violation lead to an "investigation and which results in a
finding by the NCAA ... of lack of institutional control ... or OSU being
sanctioned by the NCAA."' When OSU terminated O'Brien, the NCAA had
not issued a finding of lack of institutional control against OSU, nor had it
issued any sanctions against OSU. 112 Because the standard for a material
breach under Section 5.1(b) had not been met, O'Brien claimed OSU did not
have cause to fire him under this section. 113
In addition to his claim that OSU did not have cause to terminate him,
O'Brien also alleged in his complaint that OSU had violated the contract by
not paying him the liquidated damages he was owed for being terminated
without cause. 114 In his complaint, O'Brien alleged that he was owed not less
than $3,484,205 in liquidated damages under the contract. 115 He was also
seeking additional compensatory damages for OSU's breach of the contract
for a total of $6,000,000.116
OSU's main defense was to deny O'Brien allegations and contend that its
actions were justified under the contract.11 7 0 SU claimed it had "cause" for
terminating O'Brien and that it did so properly under the employment
agreement. 118  OSU also asserted multiple other affirmative defenses. Its
second defense was that O'Brien's claims were "barred by the doctrines of
waiver, estoppel and laches."' 19 Another defense was that O'Brien's claims
were barred by the doctrine of unclean hands. 120 A fourth defense of OSU
was that the claims were barred by O'Brien's own breaches of the contract. 121
The final defense asserted by OSU was that the claims were "barred or
reduced by [O'Brien's] failure to mitigate his alleged damages."' 22
111. Id. 35.
112. As was explained earlier in this article, the NCAA issued penalties against OSU March 10,
2006. The penalties included numerous sanctions, but did not include a finding of "lack of
institutional control."
113. Pl.'s Compl. 36, O'Brien, 2006-Ohio-1104, 2006 Ohio Misc. LEXIS 52 (No. 2004-
10230).
114. Id. 44-45.
115. Id. 46.
116. Id. 52.
117. Def.'s Answer, 5 O'Brien, 2006-Ohio-1104, 2006 Ohio Misc. LEXIS 52 (No. 2004-
10230).
118. Id.
119. Id. 54.
120. Id. 55.
121. Id. 56.
122. Id. 57.
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V. TERMINATION PROVISIONS IN OTHER COACHES' CONTRACTS
Every college basketball coach's contract will contain termination
provisions similar to those in O'Brien's contract. These provisions will
usually define what circumstances give the university cause to terminate the
coach. While the basic content of these provisions will vary little from
contract to contract, no two provisions are exactly alike. The different
language used in these provisions can cause a significant variation in their
meaning.
The language of O'Brien's contract was favorable to O'Brien. The
agreement greatly restricted OSU's ability to terminate O'Brien for cause.
Comparing O'Brien's contract to those of other Big Ten coaches, he enjoyed
advantages that many of his counterparts did not. One example of a coach
who had a less favorable termination for cause provision is University of
Minnesota coach, Dan Monson. Monson's contract states:
The University may terminate this Agreement, suspend payments
required hereunder, or take other disciplinary action as it deems
appropriate for just cause. "Just cause" as used in this Agreement
shall include, but not be limited to, the following:
a. a major violation, as determined by the University, of a rule of a
Governing Association by or involving Coach;
b. a major violation, as determined by the University, of a rule of a
Governing Association by an assistant coach of the men's
intercollegiate basketball team, any University employee for whom
Coach is administratively responsible, or representative of the
University's athletic interest which, in the judgment of the University,
Coach knew or should have known about with reasonable diligence
and oversight;
c. multiple secondary violations, as determined by the University, of
the rules of a Governing Association in or related to the men's
intercollegiate basketball program;
d. a substantial failure to perform the duties required by Section 1.2 of
this Agreement. 123
One way in which Monson's contract is less favorable than O'Brien's is
that it does not limit cause to those occurrences listed in the contract. It says
123. EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT BETWEEN THE UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA AND DAN MONSON
§ 3.1 (July 24, 1999) [hereinafter MONSON CONTRACT].
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cause includes, "but [is not] limited to, the following." 124 O'Brien's contract
stated that OSU's ability to terminate him for cause "shall be limited to the
occurrence of one or more of the following."'125 Monson's contract also has
less favorable language regarding violations of NCAA or Big Ten rules.
O'Brien's contract required a finding of lack of institutional control or OSU
being sanctioned, whereas Monson's contract provides the university cause for
"a major violation, as determined by the University."'126 This gives the
university more latitude and discretion in determining when a violation is
adequate cause to terminate.
Former Indiana University coach, Mike Davis, who resigned following the
2005-06 season, is another coach who did not enjoy the advantages of a
contract like O'Brien's. Davis's termination for cause provision stated:
The University shall have the right to end this Employment
Agreement for just cause prior to its normal expiration on June 30,
2008. The term "just cause" shall include, in addition to and as
examples of its normally understood meaning in employment
contracts, any of the following:
1. deliberate and serious violations of the duties outlined in Section
2.01 of this Agreement or refusal or unwillingness to perform such
duties in good faith and to the best of the Employee's abilities;
2. violations by the Employee of any of the other terms and conditions
of this Agreement not remedied after thirty (30) days' written notice
thereof to the Employee;
3. any conduct of the Employee in violation of any criminal statute of
moral turpitude;
4. a serious or intentional violation of any rule, regulation,
constitutional provision, bylaw or interpretation of the University, the
Big Ten Conference or the NCAA by the Employee or a member of
the men's basketball coaching staff or any other person under the
Employee's supervision and direction, including student-athletes in
the men's basketball program, which violation may, in the sole
reasonable judgment of the University, reflect adversely upon the
University or its athletic program, including any serious violation
which may result in the University being placed on probation by the
124. Id.
125. O'BRIEN CONTRACT, supra note 88, § 5.1.
126. Compare MONSON CONTRACT, supra note 123, §3.1(a), with O'BRIEN CONTRACT, supra
note 88, § 5.1(b).
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Big Ten Conference or the NCAA;
5. conduct of the Employee seriously prejudicial to the best interests
of the University or its athletics program or which violates the
University's stated mission;
6. prolonged absence from duty without the consent of the Employee's
supervisor; or
7. any cause adequate to sustain the termination of any other
University employee of the Employee's classification.
8. failure to obtain University's permission (from the Director of
Athletics) to enter into an agreement for Outside or Promotional
Income. 127
Davis's contract provided Indiana with a much wider array of options to
terminate Davis for cause than OSU had under its contract with O'Brien. For
example, Davis's contract states that cause "shall include, in addition to and as
examples of its normally understood meaning in employment contracts." 128
This language, like the "includes, but [is not] limited to" language of
Monson's contract, did not limit cause to the events listed in the contract. 129
Davis's contract also gave the university cause to fire Davis for "violations" of
the terms of the agreement. 130 This is a significant difference from O'Brien's
contract, which required a "material breach" of the agreement by O'Brien. 131
The term "material breach" requires a higher standard before the university
has cause to terminate the coach. 132
Recently, Indiana hired Kelvin Sampson to replace Mike Davis.
Sampson's contract is similar to Davis's; however, it gives the university even
more latitude in terminating Sampson for cause. The termination for cause
provision of Sampson's contract reads:
The term "just cause" shall include, in addition to and as examples of
its normally understood meaning in employment contracts, any of the
following:
1. Deliberate and serious violations of the duties outlined in Section
127. EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT BETWEEN INDIANA UNIVERSITY AND MIKE DAVIS § 6.02(B)
(May 22, 2002) [hereinafter DAVIS CONTRACT].
128. Id.
129. Id.; MONSON CONTRACT, supra note 123.
130. DAVIS CONTRACT, supra note 127, § 6.02(B)(1).
131. O'BRIEN CONTRACT, supra note 88, § 5.1(a).
132. See O'Brien v. The Ohio State Univ., 2006-Ohio-I 104, 2006 Ohio Misc. LEXIS 52 (Ohio
Ct. C1. Feb. 12, 2006).
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2.01 of this Agreement or refusal or unwillingness to perform such
duties in good faith and to the best of the Employee's abilities;
2. A material or significant violation by the Employee of any of the
other terms and conditions of this Agreement not remedied after
fourteen (14) days' written notice thereof to the Employee;
3. Any conduct of the Employee in violation of any criminal statute
(excluding minor traffic offenses) whether prosecuted or not, or any
act of moral turpitude;
4. A significant, intentional, or repetitive violation of any law, rule,
regulation, constitutional provision, bylaw or interpretation of the
University, the Big Ten Conference or the NCAA, which violation
may, in the sole judgment of the University, reflect adversely upon the
University or its athletic program, including but not limited to any
significant, intentional, or repetitive violation which may result in the
University being placed on probation by the Big Ten Conference or
the NCAA and including any violation which may have occurred
during any prior employment of the Employee at another NCAA
member institution and for which the NCAA could hold the Coach
responsible;
5. A significant, intentional, or repetitive violation of any law, rule,
regulation, constitutional provision, bylaw or interpretation of the
University, the Big Ten Conference or the NCAA by a member of the
intercollegiate men's basketball coaching staff or any other person
under the Employee's supervision and direction, including student
athletes in the program, which violation the Employee knew or should
have known of and which violation may, in the sole judgment of the
University, reflect adversely upon the University and its athletic
program, including but not limited to any significant, intentional, or
repetitive violation which may result in the University being placed on
probation by the Big Ten Conference or the NCAA;
6. Conduct of the Employee seriously prejudicial to the best interests
of the University or its athletics program or which violates the
University's stated mission;
7. Prolonged absence from duty without the consent of the
Employee's supervisor;
8. Any cause adequate to sustain the termination of any other
University employee of the Employee's classification;
9. Failure to obtain University's permission (from the Director of
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Athletics) to enter into an agreement for Outside or Promotional
Income as set forth in Section 4.05.B.4;
10. Fraud or dishonesty of Employee in the performance of his duties
or responsibilities under this Agreement;
11. Failure to maintain an environment in which the coaching staff
complies with NCAA, Big Ten and University rules and regulations;
12. Failure to comply with Article VII of this Agreement regarding
Unique Services; knowingly misleading the University about any
matters related to the men's basketball program, its assistant coaches
or student athletes;
13. Failure or refusal to recognize and cooperate with the Athletic
Director or other University officials;
14. Findings of the NCAA infractions committee referenced in
Section 4.08 that demonstrate serious, intentional, or repetitive
violations and that result in additional significant penalties or
sanctions against the Employee beyond the University of Oklahoma's
self-imposed sanctions taken against the Employee, including any
action of the NCAA that would materially impair the Employee's
ability to perform under this Agreement. 133
Sampson's contract clearly provides Indiana significant protection if it has
the desire to terminate Sampson for cause. The contract enumerates fourteen
occurrences under which Indiana can terminate Sampson for cause. 134 It also
retains the "'just cause' shall include, in addition to and as examples of its
normally understood meaning in employment contracts" language used in
Davis's contract. 135 Indiana required a more inclusive termination for cause
provision from Sampson because of NCAA violations that occurred while
Sampson was at the University of Oklahoma. 136 Indiana sought to protect
133. EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT BETWEEN INDIANA UNIVERSITY AND KELVIN SAMPSON §
6.02(B) (Apr. 20, 2006) [hereinafter SAMPSON CONTRACT].
134. Id.
135. DAVIS CONTRACT, supra note 127; EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT BETWEEN PURDUE
UNIVERSITY AND GENE KEADY § 6.01(b) (July 1, 1994) [hereinafter KEADY CONTRACT]; SAMPSON
CONTRACT, supra note 133.
136. In early 2006, the University of Oklahoma faced allegations of NCAA violations. Frank
Litsky, Universities Punished For Coach's Violations, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2006, at D2. Allegedly,
Kelvin Sampson and his assistant coaches made 577 impennissible phone calls to recruits from 2000
through 2004. Id. In May 2006, the NCAA censured Oklahoma and placed the program on two years
probation. Id. Sampson was also penalized for the violations. Id. He will be unable to make
telephone calls to recruits and visit them off campus for one year. Despite the penalties, Sampson
will keep his new job at Indiana. Id.
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itself from the repercussions of Sampson's violations at Oklahoma.
Sampson's situation at Oklahoma is the reason for many of the differences
between Davis's and Sampson's contracts. However, the O'Brien situation
probably had some impact on how Indiana negotiated and drafted Sampson's
contract.
Gene Keady, who was the long-time coach at Purdue University until
retiring after the 2004-05 season, also had a contract that contained language
very similar to the Davis and Sampson contracts. 137 Keady also could be
terminated for cause for a "violation" of the terms of the agreement instead of
a "material breach."' 138 Additionally, his contract, like Davis's, did not limit
cause to those events listed. In 2005, Matt Painter replaced Keady as the head
coach at Purdue. The termination for cause provisions of Keady and Painter's
contracts are virtually identical. 139 When hiring Painter, Purdue apparently
did not feel it needed to obtain additional protection from what it had while
Keady was the head coach. Painter's contract states:
The University shall have the right to terminate this Agreement for
just cause prior to its normal expiration on June 30, 2010. The term
"just cause" shall include, in addition to and as examples of its
normally understood meaning in employment contracts, any of the
following:
(i) Deliberate and serious violations of the duties outlined in Section
3.02 of this Agreement or refusal or unwillingness to perform such
duties in good faith and to the best of the Coach's abilities;
(ii) Violations by the Coach of any of the other terms and conditions
of this Agreement not remedied after seven (7) days written notice
thereof to the Coach;
(iii) Situations in which the University and the Coach have agreed
upon a reassignment from Head Coach of the University's
intercollegiate men's basketball team to another position within the
University, and the Coach does not thereafter accept and perform the
reassignment of responsibilities in accordance with the provisions of
Section 3.01 hereof;
(iv) Any conduct of the Coach in violation of any criminal statute of
moral turpitude;
137. KEADY CONTRACT, supra note 135.
138. Id.
139. See id.; EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT BETWEEN PURDUE UNIVERSITY AND MATT PAINTER §
6.01 (July 1, 2005) [hereinafter PAINTER CONTRACT].
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(v) A significant or repetitive violation of any law, rule, regulation,
constitutional provision, bylaw or interpretation of the University, the
Big Ten Conference or the NCAA, which violation may, in the sole
judgment of the University, reflect adversely upon the University or
its athletic program, including but not limited to any significant or
repetitive violation which may result in the University being placed on
probation by the Big Ten Conference or the NCAA and including any
violation which may have occurred during any prior employment of
the Coach at another NCAA member institution and for which the
NCAA could hold the Coach responsible;
(vi) A significant or repetitive violation of any law, rule, regulation,
constitutional provision, bylaw or interpretation of the University, the
Big Ten Conference or the NCAA by a member of the intercollegiate
men's basketball coaching staff or any other person under the Coach's
supervision and direction, including student athletes in the program,
which violation may, in the sole judgment of the University, reflect
adversely upon the University and its athletic program, including but
not limited to any significant or repetitive violation which may result
in the University being placed on probation by the Big Ten
Conference or the NCAA;
(vii) Conduct of the Coach serious prejudicial to the best interests of
the University or its athletic program or which violates the
University's mission;
(viii) Prolonged absence from duty without consent of the Coach's
reporting superior; or
(ix) Any cause adequate to sustain the termination of a tenured faculty
member of the University. 140
University of Wisconsin coach Bo Ryan has a contract that is similar to
O'Brien's; however, it is probably still less advantageous for the coach.
Ryan's contract states:
The term "just cause" shall include any of the following:
(a) A deliberate or serious violation, material in nature, of the duties
set forth in Articles I. and IV. of the Agreement, or refusal or
unwillingness to perform such duties in good faith and to the best of
Coach's abilities;
(b) A deliberate or serious violation, material in nature, of any of the
140. PAINTER CONTRACT, supra note 139, § 6.01(b).
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other terms and conditions of this Agreement not remedied after thirty
(30) days written notice thereof to Coach. In the event a default under
this section is not capable of being remedied within thirty (30) days,
Coach shall be deemed to have remedied such default if he takes
reasonable steps to remedy such default within thirty (30) days after
written notice thereof;
(c) A specific written finding following investigation by the
University's Chancellor or Athletic Director and consultation with the
Chair of the University's Athletic Board or a criminal complaint,
indictment or conviction resulting from any conduct by Coach which
constitutes moral turpitude and which would tend to bring public
disrespect, contempt or ridicule upon the University;
(d) A deliberate or serious major violation, material in nature, of any
law, rule, regulation, constitutional provision or bylaw of University,
the Big Ten Conference, or the NCAA, which major violation may, in
the sole judgment of University, reflect adversely upon University or
its athletic program, and which major violation which may in and of
itself result in University being placed on probation by the Big Ten
Conference of the NCAA;
(e) A deliberate or serious major violation, material in nature, of any
law, rule, regulation, constitutional provision or bylaw of University,
the Big Ten Conference, or the NCAA by a member of the coaching
staff, or any other person under Coach's supervision and direction,
which major violation may, in the sole judgment of University, reflect
adversely upon University or its athletic program, and which major
violation which may in and of itself result in University being placed
on probation by the Big Ten Conference or the NCAA, and which
violation was the result of Coach's failure to reasonably supervise the
offending individual(s); or
(f) Prolonged absence from duty without University's written
consent. 141
Ryan's contract is similar to O'Brien's in that it requires a material breach
on the part of Ryan to be terminated for cause. 142 Ryan's contract also covers
the same basic occurrences as O'Brien's contract, with the exception that
141. EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT BETWEEN THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN AND WILLIAM F.
RYAN JR. § V(A)(l)(a)-(f) (July 1, 2003).
142. Id. § V(A)(1)(a).
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Ryan's lists prolonged absence as just cause. 143 Ryan's contract is less
advantageous because it states "[t]he term 'just cause' shall include any of the
following." 144  This language does not necessarily limit just cause to the
occurrences enumerated in the contract. Ryan's contract is also less
advantageous than O'Brien's because it gives the University more room to
determine when a rule violation is serious enough to constitute just cause. 145
Overall, O'Brien's contract had a more favorable termination for cause
provision than most other Big Ten coaches. Michigan State Coach Tom Izzo
is the one Big Ten coach who has a termination for cause provision that is
more favorable than O'Brien's. The full termination for cause provision of
Izzo's contract states:
The University may terminate this Agreement prior to expiration of its
term at any time, without liability to the Coach or any other penalty, in
the event that the Coach engages in criminal conduct involving moral
turpitude or that the Coach materially breaches any of the terms of this
Agreement. 146
This provision greatly restricts the university's ability to terminate Izzo for
cause. With the exception of Izzo, O'Brien probably had the best termination
for cause provision in the Big Ten.
The most interesting contract to compare with O'Brien's is that of the
current OSU men's basketball Coach Thad Matta. OSU hired Matta in 2004
to replace O'Brien. Matta's contract contains a lengthy termination for cause
provision, which reads:
Ohio State may terminate this.agreement at any timefor cause, which,
for the purposes of this agreement, shall be limited to the occurrence
of one or more of the following:
a. Neglect or inattention by Coach to the duties of head basketball
coach or Coach's refusal or unwillingness or inability to perform such
duties in good faith after reasonably specific written notice has been
given to Coach by the Director, and Coach has continued such neglect,
inattention, refusal, unwillingness or inability during a subsequent
reasonable period specified by Ohio State; or
b. A significant or repetitive or intentional violation (or if Ohio State
has a reasonable basis for believing that a significant or repetitive or
143. Id. § V(A)(1)(f).
144. Id. § V(A)(1).
145. Id. § V(A)(1)(d)-(e).
146. EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT BETWEEN MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY AND TOM IZZO §
III(B)(1) (July 1, 2000).
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intentional violation has occurred) by Coach (or any other person
under Coach's supervision and direction, including student-athletes)
or any law, rule, regulation, constitutional provision, bylaw or
interpretation of Ohio State, the Big Ten Conference or the NCAA; or
c. A material breach of this agreement by Coach after receipt of a
written notice from Ohio State specifying the act(s), conduct, or
omission(s) constituting such breach which breach cannot be or has
not been cured within thirty (30) days after the date that a written
notice by Ohio State identifying such breach is sent; or
d. Commission by Coach of a crime whether prosecuted or not
(excluding minor traffic offenses) or violation by Coach of Ohio's
ethics laws; or
e. Fraud or dishonesty of Coach in the performance of his duties or
responsibilities under this agreement; or
f. Fraud or dishonesty of Coach in the preparation, falsification,
submission or alteration of documents or records of Ohio State,
NCAA or the Big Ten conference, or documents or records required to
be prepared or maintained by law, governing athletic rules or Ohio
State rules and regulations, or other documents or records pertaining
to any recruit or student-athlete, including without limitation, expense
reports, transcripts, eligibility forms or compliance reports, or
permitting, encouraging or condoning such fraudulent or dishonest
acts by any other person, provided that Coach had actual knowledge
of such fraudulent or dishonest acts or reasonably should have known
about such fraudulent or dishonest acts; or
g. Failure by Coach to respond accurately and fully within a
reasonable time to any reasonable request or inquiry relating to the
performance of his duties hereunder or the performance of his duties
during his prior employment at any other institution of higher learning
propounded by Ohio State, NCAA, the Big Ten conference or other
governing body having supervision over the athletic programs of Ohio
State or such other institution of higher learning, or required by law,
governing athletic rules or Ohio State rules and regulations; or
h. Failure by Coach to manage the Team in a manner that reflects the
academic values of Ohio State as set forth in this agreement.
i. Counseling or instructing by Coach of any coach, student or other
person to fail to respond accurately and fully within a reasonable time
to any reasonable request or inquiry concerning a matter relevant to
2006]
MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW
Ohio State's athletic programs or other institution of higher learning
which shall be propounded by Ohio State, NCAA, the Big Ten
conference or other governing body having supervision over the
athletic programs of Ohio State or such other institution of higher
learning, or required by law, governing athletic rules or Ohio State
rules and regulations; or
j. Soliciting, placing or accepting by Coach of a bet on any
intercollegiate or professional athletic contest, or permitting,
condoning or encouraging by Coach of any illegal gambling,
bookmaking or illegal betting involving any intercollegiate or
professional athletic contest whether through a bookmaker, a parlay
card, a pool or any other method of organized gambling; or furnishing
by Coach of information or data relating in any manner to basketball
or any other sport to any individual known by Coach to be or whom
he should reasonably know to be a gambler, better or bookmaker, or
an agent of any such person, or the consorting or associating by Coach
with such persons; or
k. Use or consumption by Coach of alcoholic beverages in such
degree and for such appreciable period as to impair significantly or
materially his ability to perform his duties hereunder; or failure by
Coach to fully cooperate in the enforcement and implementation of
any drug testing program established by Ohio State for student-
athletes; or
1. Coach's sale, use or possession, or Coach's permitting, encouraging
or condoning by a student-athlete, assistant coach or other athletic
staff member of the sale, use or possession of any narcotics, drugs,
controlled substances, steroids or other chemicals, the sale, use or
possession of which by Coach or such student-athlete is prohibited by
law or by governing athletic rules; or
m. Failure by Coach to report promptly to the Director any violations
known to Coach of governing athletic rules or Ohio State rules and
regulations by Coach, the assistant coaches, students or other persons
under the direct control or supervision of Coach; or
n. Failure by Coach to obtain prior approval for outside activities as
required by Section 4.5 of this agreement and by NCAA rules or to
report accurately all sources and amounts of all income and benefits as
required by NCAA rules and Section 4.5 of this agreement; or
o. Commission of or participation in by Coach of any act, situation, or
occurrence which, in Ohio State's reasonable judgment, brings Coach
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into public disrepute, contempt, scandal or ridicule or failure by Coach
to conform his personal conduct to conventional standards of good
citizenship, with such conduct offending prevailing social mores and
values and/or reflecting unfavorably upon Ohio State's reputation and
overall primary mission and objectives, including but not limited to,
acts of dishonesty, misrepresentation, fraud or violence that may or
may not rise to a level warranting criminal prosecution by the relevant
authorities. 147
There is a clear difference between the termination for cause provisions of
O'Brien and Matta's contracts. Matta's contract provides an extensive list of
the occurrences that give OSU cause to terminate. In drafting Matta's
contract, OSU clearly was doing everything possible to avoid another problem
like the O'Brien situation.
As was stated earlier in the article, the termination for cause provision of
O'Brien's contract dealt with the three broad occurrences, including a material
contract breach, a violation of NCAA or Big Ten rules, which results in a
sanction, and conduct that constitutes moral turpitude or reflects adversely on
OSU. The termination for cause provision of Matta's contract clearly covers
far more occurrences than the three covered in O'Brien's contract. Some of
the notable occurrences covered by Matta's contract and not covered by
O'Brien's are falsification of records (section f), gambling (section j), and
alcohol/drug use (sections k and 1).14 8 OSU likely included these sections in
response to recent misdeeds by O'Brien and other coaches around the country,
such as Rick Neuheisel and Bob Huggins. OSU also used broader language in
Matta's contract, which will allow OSU more discretion to terminate Matta for
cause, if it becomes necessary. Overall, the termination for cause provision in
Matta's contract is far more favorable to OSU than the termination for cause
provision in O'Brien's contract.
VI. DECISION IN THE O'BRIEN CASE
In deciding O'Brien's case, the court held that O'Brien breached Section
4. 1(d) of his contract. 149 The court found that O'Brien had reasonable cause
to believe he had violated NCAA bylaws when he loaned the Radojevic family
money.150 Section 4.1 (d) required O'Brien to report any violations that he had
147. EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT BETWEEN THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY AND THAD MATTA §
5.1 (July 8,2004).
148. Id,
149. O'Brien v. The Ohio State Univ., 2006-Ohio-1104, 2006 Ohio Misc. LEXIS 52, $ 90 (Ohio
Ct. Cl. Feb. 12, 2006).
150. Id
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"4reasonable cause to believe" had been committed."'5 The court determined
that O'Brien's actions following the loan signified that he had reasonable
cause to believe he had committed a violation. 152 O'Brien contended that he
knew Radojevic was ineligible to play college basketball, yet he continued to
take steps toward securing Radojevic as a player. The court said O'Brien's
"words and conduct are not those of a person who was sure that Radojevic
would never play college basketball."' 153  Had Radojevic been eligible,
O'Brien's loan would have been a clear violation of NCAA rules. Therefore,
O'Brien had reason to believe the loan might be a violation. The court stated
that "[t]he circumstances surrounding plaintiffs decision to make the loan
combined with plaintiffs subsequent words and conduct convince the court
that plaintiff had reasonable cause to believe that he had committed an
infraction."' 154 The court held that O'Brien breached Section 4.1(d) of his
employment agreement when he failed to report the loan. 155
Despite the court's finding that he had breached his contract, the court
held that OSU did not have proper cause to terminate O'Brien. 156 The court
determined that O'Brien's breach was not material, and therefore, under the
language of the contract, OSU did not have cause to fire O'Brien. 157 Looking
at its common law meaning, the court determined a material breach to be "a
failure to do something that is so fundamental to a contract that the failure to
perform that obligation defeats the essential purpose of the contract or makes
it impossible for the other party to perform under the contract." 158 The court
also looked at the Restatement of Contracts to identify five factors that should
be considered when determining whether a breach is material.' 59
The first factor the court reviewed was the extent to which O'Brien's
breach deprived OSU of the benefit it reasonably expected under the
contract. 160 OSU claimed the breach deprived it of the benefit of the contract
in three ways: "subjecting defendant to NCAA sanctions; adversely affecting
defendant's reputation in the community; and breaching the trust between
151. O'BRIEN CONTRACT, supra note 88, § 4.1(d)
152. O'Brien, 2006-Ohio-1 104, 2006 Ohio Misc. LEXIS 52, 85.
153. Id. 89.
154. Id. 85.
155. Id. T90.
156. Id. 169.
157. Id.
158. Id. 97.
159. Id. 99-104.
160. Id. 100.
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plaintiff and defendant's athletic director."'161 The court found that the harm
to OSU in these three areas was not as significant as OSU contended. 162 The
court said, "the evidence shows that the NCAA sanctions and the injury to
defendant's reputation that can be fairly attributed to the loan are relatively
minor." 163 Regarding the loss of trust issue, the court held that it was not
more than an implied term of the contract. 164 Neither the contract nor the
termination letter of June 8, 2004 referenced trust of the athletic director. 165
The court determined that OSU would have included trust of the athletic
director in the agreement if it were as important to the transaction as OSU
claims. 166 The court made this determination based on the amount of detail
used in the agreement to discuss "other important aspects of the parties'
relationship."'167
The second factor considered when determining whether the breach was
material was the extent to which O'Brien could compensate OSU for his
failure to perform. 168 The court determined that O'Brien could have done
little to compensate OSU because the injury to OSU was largely non-
economic. 169
The third factor was the extent to which the breaching party would suffer
forfeiture. 170 The court found that O'Brien would suffer significant forfeiture
if the breach were determined to be material. 171 If the breach was material and
OSU had cause to fire O'Brien, he would receive no further compensation
from OSU, whereas, if the breach was not material and he was terminated
without cause, he would be entitled to a significant amount in liquidated
damages. 172
The fourth factor was O'Brien's ability to cure his failure. 173 The court
determined that O'Brien could not cure the damage of the sanctions and the
damage to OSU's reputation. 174 However, the court reasoned that O'Brien
161. Id. 1 109.
162. Id. 151.
163. Id.
164. Id. 141.
165. Id. 136.
166. Id. 140.
167. Id.
168. Id. 101.
169. Id. 142.
170. Id. 102.
171. Id. 143.
172. Id.
173. Id. 103.
174. Id. 144.
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could cure the breach of trust because he could repair his relationship with
Geiger.175 The court found that "with time and effort, trust could have been
restored."' 76
The final factor to consider was the extent to which O'Brien's actions
failed to conform to standards of good faith. 177  The court found that
O'Brien's "failure to disclose the loan was not completely consistent with
good faith and fair dealing." 178 However, the court did note that the loan was
made for "humanitarian purposes."' 79 The court also determined that OSU
did not act in good faith when dealing with O'Brien after he admitted to
making the loan. 180
After analyzing the five factors, the court determined that O'Brien's
breach was not material; and thus, OSU did not have cause to terminate
O'Brien. 18 1 In addressing the loan to Radojevic, the court said, "that this
single, isolated failure of performance was not so egregious as to frustrate the
essential purpose of that contract and thus render future performance by
defendant impossible."' 82 The court held that because O'Brien's termination
was without cause, OSU was contractually obligated to pay O'Brien in
accordance with the termination without cause provisions of the contract. 183
The court also held that OSU breached the contract when it decided to
terminate O'Brien without compensation. 184
On August 2, 2006, O'Brien was awarded just over $2.25 million in
damages. 185 The court arrived at this amount by looking at O'Brien's
employment contract. 186 The court determined that the liquidated damages
prescribed in Sections 5.2 and 5.3 of O'Brien's contract are proportionate to
O'Brien's actual damages. 187 In determining that the liquidated damages were
proportionate, the court also determined that the contract as a whole was not
unreasonable. Addressing the reasonableness of the contract, the court stated:
175. Id. 145.
176. Id.
177. Id. 104.
178. Id. 147.
179. Id. 148.
180. Id. 150.
181. Id. 151.
182. Id. 169.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. O'Brien v. The Ohio State Univ., 2006-Ohio-4346, 2006 Ohio Misc. LEXIS 129 (Ohio Ct.
C1. Aug. 2, 2006), available at http://www.dispatch.com/2006/08/02/obrien.pdf.
186. Id.
187. Id.
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The contract is extremely favorable to plaintiff but it is not
unreasonable. The parties in this case negotiated a contract virtually
guaranteeing plaintiff that he could not be terminated for an NCAA
infraction, without compensation, unless the NCAA had made a
finding that plaintiff had committed a major infraction that resulted in
either a finding of lack of institutional control or the imposition of
serious sanctions. As was discussed extensively in the court's
February 15, 2006, liability decision, defendant's right to terminate
plaintiff for cause under Section 5.1 (a) was limited to those instances
where the breach was material. In other words, the terms of the
contract made it very difficult for defendant to terminate plaintiffs
employment, without a financial consequence, upon learning that
plaintiff had committed an NCAA infraction. 188
In arriving at $2.25 million in damages, the court first found that OSU
owed O'Brien $236,551.60 in liquidated damages under Section 5.2 of the
contract. 189 This amount included O'Brien's base salary for 2004 ($188,335),
the value of his yearly employee benefits ($28,784) and the value of his use of
a vehicle provided by OSU ($19,432.60).190 Secondly, the court determined
that O'Brien was owed $2,017,067.85 in additional liquidated damages under
Section 5.3 of the contract. 191 The court arrived at this amount by multiplying
the years remaining on the contract (3.06) by O'Brien's base salary
($188,335).192 This calculation resulted in an amount of $576,305.10, which
was then multiplied by 3.5 in accordance with Section 5.3.193 The resulting
amount was added to the Section 5.2 liquidated damages, for a total damages
award of $2,253,619.45.194
The liquidated damages award was less than the $3,571,964.45 O'Brien
believed he was entitled to.195 The amounts were different because the court
opted to invalidate the final two years of the contract because they were
extension options that had not been exercised at the time of the termination. 196
The court also awarded O'Brien prejudgment interest. 197 The amount of
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
MARQUETTE SPORTS LA W REVIEW
prejudgment interest will be decided at a later hearing. 198 In addition, to be
decided at the later hearing is how much O'Brien must repay OSU for bonuses
he received in 2000 and 2002.199 The court held that O'Brien must repay
championship bonuses from those years because the NCAA stripped OSU of
all basketball championships won during those seasons. 200 The court found
that "genuine issues of fact" exist regarding the amount of the bonuses; thus,
the amount O'Brien must repay will be determined at a later hearing. 20 1
Perhaps the O'Brien case will be complete following the next hearing;
however, it appears that OSU might appeal the recent decision. 202
VII. LESSONS TO BE LEARNED
A. Termination for Just Cause - What is Just Cause?
Oftentimes a coach can be fired or terminated for causes that are not
subject to dictionary definition, that require legal interpretation and that
contain terms that no two lawyers or even a judge can ultimately agree upon
the meaning of. These terms include: (1) conduct seriously prejudicial to the
best interests of the university; (2) moral turpitude; (3) material breach; (4)
serious or intentional violations of any rule or regulation; (5) gross negligence
in performance; (6) perpetuation of willful fraud; (7) an immoral act; (8)
habitual intoxication; and (9) dishonesty. If the terms are not subject to clear
and simple, Webster-style definitions, they should not be in the coach's
contract. Specific acts constituting just cause for termination need to be
strictly defined, rather than couched in broad-based statements that are subject
to interpretation. These phrases, if used, ought to be defined in terms of
specific prohibited acts. The fact that the language used in coaches' just cause
provisions is subject to definition and is factual in nature, is an even better
reason that the ultimate fact finder, who determines whether just cause exists,
should be an impartial hearing examiner.
B. Dirty Laundry
Most universities like to resolve their dirty laundry in house, rather than
making it a public affair. This certainly is true in the world of college
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Kevin Mayhood, $2.25 Million Verdict, Improper Loan to Recruit Doesn't Justify Firing of
Former Coach, Judge Rules, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Aug. 3, 2006, at 01 .A.
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coaching. In his book College Sports, Inc.,203 Murray Sperber indicates that
although a university may have cause to dismiss a coach, and even though that
coach may cause an NCAA investigation and ensuing penalties, universities
prefer to settle their differences with a breaching coach rather than fire him
outright.204 This is the case, even though the university is absolved from its
obligations if the coach violates NCAA rules.
The recent firing of Bob Huggins as the head basketball coach of the
University of Cincinnati is an excellent example of a situation where the
university probably had grounds for termination for cause, but both the coach
and the university chose to negotiate a resolution under the "not for cause"
provision. On August 23, 2005, University President Nancy Zimpher sent
Huggins an ultimatum giving him twenty-four hours to decide whether he
wanted to resign or be fired.205
Zimpher's concerns stemmed from certain incidents that Huggins, his
coaching staff and his players had been involved in.2 06 These incidents
include Huggins being arrested and later pleading no contest to DUI charges,
207 which is a misdemeanor in Ohio as a first-time offense. 20 8 Huggins was
suspended for seventy-six days and the rollover provision in his contract was
not exercised.209 Assistant coach Keith LeGree was also arrested for a DUI on
March 23, 2005 and was later found not guilty of the charge.210 Player Roy
Bright was arrested for carrying a concealed weapon on campus on May 10,
2005; Huggins later dismissed Bright from the team.211 Player Tyree Evans
was charged with statutory rape on June 8, 2005.212 Also, in 1998, Cincinnati
was charged with multiple NCAA violations in separate categories, including
a lack of appropriate institutional control.213 Zimpher said that she would not
apologize for setting high standards and that Huggins and the program did not
203. MURRAY SPERBER, COLLEGE SPORTS, INC.: THE ATHLETIC DEPARTMENT VS THE
UNIVERSITY (1990).
204. Id. at 165.
205. Mark Schlabach, Cincinnati Orders Huggins to Resign Today or Be Fired, WASH. POST,
Aug. 24, 2005, at E02.
206. Id.
207. Paul Daugherty & Bill Koch, Cincinnati Gives Ultimatum to Huggins, CINCINNATI
ENQUIRER, Aug. 23, 2005, available at http://www.usatoday.com/sports/college/mensbasketball/
bigeast/2005-08-23-cincimnati-huggins x.htm?POE=SPOISVA.
208. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.194 (2006).
209. Daughtery & Koch, supra note 206.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
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fit into the "goals of the university's sweeping academic plan." 214
On August 24, 2005, Huggins chose to resign and accepted a buyout from
the University. 215 The resignation and buyout were settled by the Eighth
Amendment to Huggins's Employment Contract, dated September 1, 2005.216
The amendment provides that the University is obligated to pay Huggins
$58,333.33 for each month remaining on his contract, which was to end on
June 30, 2008, or a total of $1,983,333.22.217 Additionally, the University was
required to pay Huggins $700,000, $70,000 of which had already been paid,
for reimbursement of taxes incurred. 218 The University had until September
15, 2005 to make the payment.219  The aforereferenced payments are
guaranteed payments irrespective of whether Huggins fulfills additional
employment obligations at the University or obtains other employment. 220
The Eighth Amendment further acknowledges that Huggins's employment
contract was to be terminated without cause effective September 1, 2005.221
What is of interest with respect to the Huggins resolution is whether the
University of Cincinnati could have fired Huggins had he not resigned and
accepted the buyout as contained in the Eighth Amendment to Employment
Contract. Several contract clauses in Huggins' Employment Contract are
pertinent to this discussion.
Huggins's original employment contract, dated July 13, 1995, was
amended eight times, with the final amendment (Eighth Amendment to
Employment Contract) dated September 1, 2005.222 Under Paragraph 4 of the
employment contract entitled "Coach's Duties," Huggins promised and agreed
as follows:
To recognize and comply with the laws, policies, rules, and
regulations of and governing the University and its employees and the
constitution, bylaws, interpretations, rules and regulations of the
National Collegiate Athletic Association (hereinafter "NCAA") as
now constituted or as they may be amended during the term hereof.
214. Id.
215. Huggins to Step Down with $3-Million Deal, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2005, at D2.
216. EIGHTH AMENDMENT TO EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT BETWEEN THE UNIVERSITY OF
CINCINNATI AND ROBERT E. HUGGINS (Sept. 1, 2005).
217. Id. § 2(A)(1).
218. Id. § 2(A)(2).
219. Id.
220. Id. § 2(A)(3).
221. Id. § 3.
222. EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT BETWEEN THE UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI AND ROBERT E.
HUGGINS (July 13, 1995).
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Coach shall also endeavor to ensure that all assistant coaches and any
other employees for which Coach is administratively responsible
comply with the aforesaid policies, rules, and regulations as well. In
the event that the Coach becomes aware, or has reasonable cause to
believe, that violations of such constitution, bylaws, interpretations,
rules or regulations may have taken place, he shall report the same
promptly to the Director and to the President simultaneously." 223
Paragraph 5.1.2 of the employment contract deals with termination by the
University without cause:
In the event of the death or termination of the employment of the
Coach by the University without cause during the term hereof, the
Coach (or his estate) shall receive, in lieu of the compensation and
benefits provided for herein, monthly payments at the rate of Seven
Hundred Thousand Dollars ($700,000.00) per year, from the date of
such death or termination without cause through the expiration of the
term of this Contract, June 30, 2005.224
Paragraph 5.2 of the employment contract delineates what occurs if the
University terminates the coach's contract for cause:
The University may at any time upon written notice to Coach and in
accordance with University policy and procedures terminate this
Contract and his employment for "cause", which shall include,
without limitation, termination on any of the following grounds:
5.2.1 deliberate and major violation by Coach of any of his obligations
under Section 4.1.3 heretofore of any departmental regulations
contained in the Department of Athletics Policy and Procedure
Manual as it now exists or may be reasonably amended relating to the
conduct and administration of the basketball or athletic program,
including, but not limited to, recruiting rules;
5.2.2 any conduct by Coach which constitutes moral turpitude, or
which would be reasonably likely to damage the reputation of the
University;
5.2.3 any material breach of the provisions of this Contract; or
5.2.4 Coach's refusal to perform the duties reasonably required herein,
or for any reason his unavailability to the University to perform fully
223. Id. § 4.1.3.
224. Id. § 5.1.2.
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such duties.225
Under Paragraph 5.2.2 of the Employment Contract, the University could
have terminated Huggins for cause for "any conduct ...which would be
reasonably likely to damage the reputation of the University. 226  The
combination of incidents that Huggins, his staff and players were involved in
could have amounted to and resulted in conduct that "damages the
University's reputation." The damage to reputation provision is such a catch-
all phrase that it would follow that a coach being arrested and pleading no
contest to a DUI, an assistant coach being charged with a DUI and multiple
player run-ins with the law could have been considered such conduct under
Paragraph 5.2.2 of the Employment Contract. If Zimpher had utilized this
clause to terminate Huggins, then, under Paragraph 5.3, his salary and benefits
would also have been terminated; instead, under the Eighth Amendment, the
University will pay Huggins $58,333.33 per month until June 2008, which is
the same amount Huggins would have received under the termination without
cause provision of his contract.
Zimpher was very concerned with the university's reputation, and a
further acknowledgement of this situation would have negatively affected the
university. Termination for cause proceedings usually hang out the dirty
laundry of the university in the public, involve protracted and expensive
litigation in which the university is not always successful and offend many
loyal fans and alumni.
Compromise seems to be the modus operandi when a university is
desirous of terminating its relationship with a coach, where potential
termination for cause exists. The Huggins termination, as well as the many
terminations that occur in the coaching industry annually, point out the fact
that the back end of the contract, i.e. the termination provisions, may be as
important as the financial terms of the contract.
While the modus operandi in college coaching terminations has been to
settle in the backroom rather than the courtroom, the O'Brien case and the
Rick Neuheisel case that preceded it may be setting a new precedent in the
area of coaches' disputes with universities. Aggrieved coaches, who believe
that they were not terminated for just cause, now seem to be willing to let the
dirty laundry hang out in a courtroom and to use the public forum as leverage
against the university. The Neuheisel case against the University of
Washington 227 case is a good example of this.
225. Id. § 5.2.
226. Id. § 5.2.2.
227. See Seattle Times Staff, The UW/Neuheisel Saga, SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 8, 2005, at A13.
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The events that led to Washington's early termination of Neuheisel's
contract began in 2002 when the then assistant athletic director, Dana
Richardson, who oversees NCAA compliance, sent out a memo to the entire
athletic department. 228 The memo stated that it was permissible for athletic
department employees to participate in pools for the NCAA men's college
basketball tournament as long as the pools were conducted outside of
Washington's athletic department and the other participants in the pools were
not employed by the athletic department. 229 This memo was based, in part, on
outdated bylaws, which were employed by the NCAA on its website. 230 The
NCAA had failed to update the gambling bylaw as it appeared on the website
with the new revision to the rule that includes the key provision of which
Neuheisel was found to be in violation.231  This memo was in direct
opposition to NCAA rules against gambling.232 Gambling on professional and
collegiate athletics is specifically prohibited by Bylaw 10.3 of the NCAA
rules, which provides that "staff members of the athletics department of a
member institution ... shall not knowingly ... solicit or accept a bet on any
intercollegiate competition for any item (e.g., cash, shirt, dinner) that has
tangible value." 233 Relying on this memo and another memo that Richardson
distributed in 2003 to the same effect, Neuheisel participated with friends and
neighbors in March Madness auctions, 234 which amounted to the same thing
as a men's college basketball tournament betting pool. Millions of Americans
participate in NCAA basketball pools, and Neuheisel believed that his
participation in the pools was in accordance with NCAA regulations until he
attended the 2003 NCAA annual meeting in Seattle, Washington.
On June 4, 2003, Neuheisel was asked to attend an interview with NCAA
investigators who were said to be investigating allegations of minor recruiting
issues occurring at Washington that involved Neuheisel. 235 In actuality, the
NCAA investigators were interested in Neuheisel's participation in the betting
pools during the 2002 and 2003 men's basketball tournaments. 236 According
228. Bob Condotta, NCAA Official Says Memo not an Excuse: UW May Face Penalties if Found
in Violation of NCAA Gambling Rules, SEATTLE TIMES, June 10, 2003, at D1.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. NAT'L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS'N, 2005-06 NCAA DIvIsIoN I MANUAL art. 10.3(d)
(2005-06), available at http://www.ncaa.org/library/membership/division-i-manual/2005-06/2005-
06_dl manual.pdf.
234. Condotta, supra note 227.
235. Neuheisel Sues Washington Over Firing, HOUS. CHRON., Aug. 22, 2003, at 2.
236. Id.
2006]
MARQUETTE SPORTS LA W REVIEW
to NCAA bylaws, the NCAA enforcement staff is supposed to provide some
sort of formal or informal notice of the inquiry and the allegations that are
being investigated before the individual is questioned about the particular
matter.237 Bylaw 32.3.7 specifically provides that when the NCAA requests
an interview with an institutional employee regarding possible violations of
NCAA regulations, the employee to be interviewed "shall be advised that the
purpose of the interview is to determine whether the individual has knowledge
of or has been involved directly or indirectly in any violation of NCAA
legislation." 238 There was no such notice in Neuheisel's case; he was actually
misled by the investigators because there were no recruiting violations that
were to be discussed in the interview.239 The NCAA investigators essentially
undertook an ambush interview, a practice directly in opposition to the NCAA
bylaws, which require disclosure of the purpose of the interview. Neuheisel
walked into the interview expecting to answer questions about possible
recruiting violations and instead was bombarded with questions about his
participation in neighborhood March Madness auctions in 2002 and 2003.
Initially, Neuheisel, surprised by the questioning, denied any involvement in
the pools, but later that same day he recanted his original denial of betting on
the tournament and admitted to the investigators that he had taken part in the
tournament pools.240
Washington fired Neuheisel shortly after his interview with the NCAA
investigators in June 2003, six months before the term of his original contract
with the University was to end.241 In support of Washington's decision to fire
Neuheisel, Washington cited Neuheisel's participation in two NCAA men's
basketball betting pools in 2002 and 2003, but relied most heavily on
Neuheisel's dishonesty about his participation in the pools when initially
questioned by the NCAA investigators about his involvement in the pools.242
Washington stated that the fact that Neuheisel was not forthcoming with the
NCAA investigators and gave false statements to the investigators was a
sufficient reason for termination with cause under his contract. 243 Paragraph 8
of Neuheisel's contract states that the university shall have the right to
237. NAT'L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS'N, 2006-07 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL art. 32.3.7.1
(2006-07)
238. Id.
239. See Bud Withers, Ruling Limits NCAA Defense; Neuheisel Trial - Judge Restricts Testimony
on Bylaw About Interviews, SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 2, 2005, at D3.
240. Neuheisel Sues Washington Over Firing, supra note 234.
241. Bryan Burwell, Huskies Find Way to Wash Neuheisel Out of Their Hair, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH, June 13, 2003, at El.
242. Id.
243. See id.
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terminate this agreement for just cause prior to its normal expiration.244 The
term "just cause" shall include, in addition to and as examples of its normally
understood meaning in employment contracts, any of the following:
a. Violation by Employee of any of the material provisions of this
Agreement not corrected by Employee within ten (10) days following
receipt of notification of such violation from the University;
b. Refusal or unwillingness by Employee to perform his duties
hereunder in good faith or to the best of Employee's abilities;
c. Any serious act of misconduct by Employee, including but not
limited to, an act of dishonesty, theft or misappropriation of
University property, moral turpitude, insubordination, or act injuring,
abusing, or endangering others;
d. A serious or intentional violation of any law, rule, regulation,
constitutional provision, by-law, or interpretation of the University,
the state of Washington, the PAC-10, or the NCAA, which violation
may, in the sole discretion of the University, reflect adversely upon
the University or its athletic program in a material way; or
e. Any other conduct of Employee seriously and materially
prejudicial to the best interests of the University or its athletic
program. 245
Washington based its termination on Paragraph 8(c), which lists as one of
the acts that can constitute just cause for termination as "an act of
dishonesty.' 246
Neuheisel also had a due process provision in his contract.
Just cause sufficient to satisfy the provisions of this paragraph shall
initially be determined by the Director. Upon such determination, the
Director shall have the authority to order the paid suspension of
Employee from his duties pending termination of this Agreement,
provided that notice of any such termination shall be delivered to
Employee in writing, detailing the reasons for the termination and
setting forth a reasonable time within which the Employee may
respond. Employee may respond to the Director's notice of
termination in writing or in person. The Director will consider
Employee's response and issue a written decision. If Employee is
244. See Martin J. Greenberg & Robert L. Thomas, The Rick Neuheisel Case: Lessons Learned
from the "Washout" in Washington, FOR THE RECoRD, Apr.-June 2005, at 7-8.
245. Id.
246. Id.
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dissatisfied with the Director's decision, Employee shall have the
procedural right, upon written request, to a review and an informal
hearing by the Special Assistant to the President relating to any such
termination ordered by the Director. Any such hearing shall be
governed by applicable University rules and state law and shall be
held within a reasonable time after the Director's decision. The
Special Assistant to the President will review the matter and gather
additional information as appropriate. After review, the Special
Assistant to the President will notify Employee and the Director of the
decision and the final disposition of the issue. This right to a hearing
by the Special Assistant to the President shall be in lieu of any right to
review that may be provided for in the Personnel Program.247
The contract further provided that in the event Neuheisel was terminated
for cause in accordance with the provisions of Paragraph 8, all obligations of
Washington to make further payments or provide other consideration would
cease.248 Under no circumstances would Washington have been liable to
Neuheisel for the loss of any collateral opportunities or other benefits,
perquisites or income from any source.249
On or about August 21, 2003, Neuheisel commenced a lawsuit in the
Superior Court of Washington for King County against Washington and the
NCAA.250 Neuheisel claimed that Washington breached his contract by
terminating his contract for just cause, failing to give him a fair and impartial
hearing, and failing to pay all monies due under and pursuant to his
contract. 251 Neuheisel claimed that the NCAA defamed him, put him in a
false light and tortiously interfered with his contract by encouraging
Washington to terminate him.252 In addition, he claimed that the NCAA
unlawfully interfered with prospective employment or advantage and further
conspired against Neuheisel. 253
Neuheisel's twenty-one month legal battle ended on March 7, 2005 when
a settlement of the case was announced by Superior Court Judge Michael
Spearman after five weeks of testimony, just as jurors were about to hear
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. See Bob Condotta, Neuheisel Sues UW, NCAA: Fired Coach Claims Conspiracy, Says
University Caved in to Pressure, SEATTLE TIMES, Aug. 22, 2003, at Al.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id.
[Vol. 17:1
TERMINATION OF COACHING CONTRA CTS
closing statements. 254 The settlement was for Neuheisel to receive a cash
payment of $2.5 million from the NCAA and $500,000 from Washington.255
"Additionally, the university agreed not to seek repayment of a $1.5 million
loan."256 Neuheisel's lawyers put the settlement amount at $4.7 million,
indicating that the settlement included $200,000 in forgiven loan interest.257
C. Due Process
O'Brien's victory over OSU was significant because coaches have rarely
been successful challenging their terminations in a court of law. O'Brien's
situation was one that is common among college coaches. College coaching is
a volatile industry where coaches are hired to be fired on a regular basis.
Universities will try to terminate coaches for just cause whenever possible;
however, terminated coaches, like O'Brien, will not always agree that just
cause exists. Disagreement over the existence of just cause tends to raise
numerous questions. The first question is who 'initially determines if an
occurrence qualifies as just cause for termination purposes. This question is
easy to answer in most situations because the university athletic director will
usually make this initial determination.
If an athletic director decides to terminate a coach for just cause, other
important questions thereafter come into play. The first of which is, what
happens if the coach disagrees? Secondly, what type of due process rights
does the coach have? Included within the question of due process are
numerous issues. What method(s) of challenging the athletic director's
decision is available to the coach? What appellate rights, beyond the original
challenge, does the coach have? Who will be making the ultimate decision?
These questions are all very important because the form of due process in
place will often determine the coach's fate. Procedural and substantive due
process rights, such as written notice, a statement of the factual basis for
termination, a right to a hearing, an objective and impartial hearing, a
procedure governed by rules and regulations, discovery, right to counsel, right
to cross examine witnesses, right to provide a defense, and privacy, are very
important to the coach.
A coach's due process rights will depend on the coach's employment
contract or university grievance rules. Much like termination for cause
provisions, there is significant variation among due process provisions.
254. Len Ziehm, Neuheisel Settles Lawsuit for $4.5M, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Mar. 8, 2005, at 91.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id.
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However, due process contract provisions can generally be grouped into five
categories.
The first category provides the coach with the same due process rights as
other university employees. Typically, these provisions do not enumerate the
exact procedural and substantive rights of the coach in detail. The provision
often refers to a separate document, such as a university policy or a collective
bargaining agreement, which explains in detail the due process rights. The
rights available will vary based on the university; however, they usually give
the coach a chance to challenge the termination and a right to one appeal. The
following are examples of this category of due process provision.
University of Connecticut - Randy Edsall (Football)
In the event the Coach is disciplined or removed for just cause, the
procedures shall be those currently contained in Article 13 of the
Collective Bargaining Agreement between the University of
Connecticut and the University of Connecticut Chapter, American
Association of University Professors (July 1, 2002 - June 30, 2007),
which is incorporated herein. In the event that there is a new
Collective Bargaining Agreement, any provisions pertaining to
discipline or termination of bargaining unit members not in a tenure
track shall apply. 258
University of Missouri - Gary Pinkel (Football)
The Head Football Coach shall have the procedural right to a review
and hearing relating to any such determination. Any such hearing
shall be governed by normal University grievance procedures
provided for employees of the Head Football Coach's classification,
as now or hereafter amended, unless other procedures are agreed upon
by the parties. 259
The exact due process rights of Randy Edsall are found in the Collective
Bargaining Agreement between the University of Connecticut and the
University of Connecticut Chapter of the American Association of University
Professors. According to the collective bargaining agreement, the following
procedures apply:
1. The staff member shall receive in writing a statement of the reasons
for the action being recommended.
258. EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT BETWEEN THE UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT AND RANDY
EDSALL § 10.1 (July 1, 2004) [hereinafter EDSALL CONTRACT ].
259. EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT BETWEEN THE UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI AND GARY PINKEL § 5
(Nov. 20, 2003) [hereinafter PINKEL CONTRACT].
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2. Within seven (7) calendar days of receiving the written statement
(B. 1), the staff member may request a hearing before his/her Dean or
Director or designee with an AAUP representative present, should the
staff member so desire. This hearing shall be held within seven (7)
calendar days of the employee's request.
3. Within seven (7) calendar days of receiving the recommendation in
B.2 above, the staff member shall have the right to appeal to the
Chancellor or his/her designee. At such appellate hearing, the staff
member shall have the right to be represented by the AAUP.
4. The decision of the Chancellor or designee may be appealed to
arbitration on the merits under Article 10 of this agreement. Warnings,
reprimands, and other less severe discipline shall be grievable through
steps B.2 and B.3 above but shall not be grievable to arbitration. 260
Gary Pinkel's due process rights can be found in the University of
Missouri Human Resources Policy Manual. 261 The manual provides Pinkel
the following procedural rights:
Should an employee or the employee's representative feel, after oral
discussion with the immediate supervisor, that employee's rights
under University policy have been violated, the employee may
originate a grievance within ten (10) days of the date the alleged
grievable act occurred by presenting the facts in writing to the proper
supervisor, department head, or designated representative of the
University with a copy to the Campus Grievance Representative. The
decision of such official shall be made in writing to the employee
within ten (10) days after receipt of grievance. For an alleged act of
prohibited discrimination, an employee has a 180-day filing period.
Should the employee decide the reply is unsatisfactory, the employee
or the employee's representative shall, within five (5) days, submit an
appeal to the Campus Grievance Representative. The Campus
Grievance Representative or designate shall respond in writing to the
grievance within five (5) days from the date of the review. If the
grievance is resolved, no further action will be necessary.
If the grievance is not satisfactorily resolved, the employee or the
260. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT
BOARD OF TRUSTEES AND THE UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT CHAPTER OF THE AMERICAN
ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS art. 13.7(B)(1-4) (July 1, 2002), available at
http://www.uconnaaup.org/resources/contract.htmil.
261. UNIV. OF MISSOURI, HUMAN RESOURCES POLICY MANUAL HR-502 (2006), available at
http://www.umsystem.edu/ums/departments/hr/manual/502.shtml.
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employee's representative may appeal within five (5) days after
receipt of response to the University Grievance Representative for the
purpose of reviewing the grievance. The decision of the University
Grievance Representative or designate shall be made in writing to the
employee and/or employee's representative within five (5) days after
the date of the review.
Should the employee decide that the reply of the University Grievance
Representative or designate is unsatisfactory, the matter may be
appealed within five (5) days of receipt of the response through the
University Grievance Representative to a grievance committee which
shall be established: the employee or employee's representative may
designate one (1) member; the University through its Grievance
Representative, with the approval of the Chancellor of the campus,
shall appoint one (1) member; and the selection of the third member
shall be made by these two (2) members. If mutually agreeable, the
two (2) designated members may select the third member from a list
recommended by either and approved by both. Otherwise, selection
will be made from a list of committee members supplied by the
Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service and maintained by UM
Human Resources. The selection will be made by reducing the list in
alternate turns. The toss of a coin shall determine the elimination
sequence.
A decision of the grievance committee may be reached upon the
concurrence of any two (2) of the three (3) members. A hearing will
be scheduled as soon as feasible after selection of the third committee
member. The grievance committee shall keep a complete record of the
hearing before it, including any exhibits or papers submitted to it in
connection with the hearing and a complete record of any testimony
taken. Upon the rendering of its decision, the complete record shall be
filed in the Office of the President of the University and shall be
available to the employee, employee's representative and the
University Grievance Representative. Any cost of the third party on
the committee and cost of transcript (if requested) shall be paid
equally by the employee and the University.
In the event the decision of the grievance committee is unsatisfactory
to either the employee or the University Grievance Representative,
either may, within five (5) days after receipt of the decision of the
grievance committee, file a written notice of appeal to the Board of
Curators by delivering such notice of appeal to the President of the
University. Upon the receipt of the notice of appeal, the President of
[Vol. 17:1
TERMINATION OF COACHING CONTRACTS
the University shall cause the record of the hearing before the
grievance committee to be filed with the Board of Curators of the
University, who shall review such record. The decision of the Board
of Curators, upon such review, will be final. 262
One other coach who is given the due process rights of other university
employees is University of North Carolina football coach, John Bunting.
Bunting's contract provides him with all the employment rights found in the
Employment Policies for Instructional and Research EPA Non-Faculty
Employees of The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. This policy
provides the following due process rights:
1. If, within ten days after the employee receives the notice of intent to
discharge referred to in Section III.D., above, the employee makes no
written request for either specification of reasons or a hearing, he or
she may be discharged without recourse to any further institutional
procedure by a written letter of discharge from the Chancellor or his
or her delegate.
2. If, within ten days after he or she receives the notice referred to in
Section III.D., above, the employee makes written request, by
registered mail, return receipt requested, for a specification of reasons,
the Chancellor or his or her delegate shall supply such specification in
writing by registered mail, return receipt requested, within ten days
after receiving the request. If the employee makes no written request
for a hearing within ten days after he or she receives the specification,
the employee may be discharged without recourse to any further
institutional procedure by a written letter of discharge from the
Chancellor or his or her delegate.
3. If the employee makes a timely written request for a hearing, a
hearing shall be accorded before the EPA Non Faculty Grievance
Committee. The hearing shall be on the written specification of
reasons for the intended discharge. The hearing committee shall
accord the employee twenty days from the time it receives his or her
written request for a hearing to prepare his or her defense. The
Committee may, upon the employee's written request and for good
cause, extend this time by written notice to the employee.
4. The hearing shall be closed to the public unless the employee and
the Committee agree that it may be open. The employee shall have the
right to counsel, to present the testimony of witnesses and other
262. Id.
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evidence, to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses, and to
examine all documents and other adverse demonstrative evidence. A
written transcript of all proceedings shall be kept; upon request, a
copy thereof shall be furnished to the employee at the University's
expense.
5. The Chancellor, or his or her delegate or counsel, may participate in
the hearing to present evidence, cross-examine witnesses, and make
argument.
6. In reaching decisions on which its written recommendations to the
Chancellor shall be based, the Committee shall consider only the
evidence presented at the hearing and such written and oral arguments
as the Committee, in its discretion, may allow. The Committee shall
make its written recommendations to the Chancellor within ten days
after its hearing concludes.
7. With respect to any grievance, if the Chancellor concurs in a
recommendation of the Committee that is favorable to the employee,
his or her decision shall be final. If the Chancellor either declines to
accept a Committee recommendation that is favorable to the employee
or concurs in a Committee recommendation that is unfavorable to the
employee, the employee may appealthe Chancellor's decision to the
Board of Trustees. This appeal shall be transmitted through the
Chancellor and be addressed to the Chairman of the Board. Notice of
appeal shall be filed within ten days after the employee receives the
Chancellor's decision. The appeal to the Board of Trustees shall be
decided by the Board of Trustees. However, the Board may delegate
the duty of conducting a hearing to a standing or ad hoc committee of
at least three members. The Board of Trustees, or its committee, shall
consider the appeal on the record, but it may, in its discretion, hear
such other evidence as it deems necessary. In all cases, review shall be
limited to the question of whether the Chancellor committed clear and
material error in reaching his or her decision. The Board of Trustees'
decision shall be made within 120 calendar days after the Chancellor
has received the employee's request for an appeal to the Trustees. This
decision shall be final except that the employee may, within ten days
after receiving the Trustees' decision, file a written petition for review
with the Board of Governors if he or she alleges that one or more
specified provisions of The Code of The University of North Carolina
have been violated. All such petitions to the Board of Governors shall
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be transmitted through the President.263
A second category of due process provision allows the coach the right to
challenge the athletic director's initial termination decision in front of the
university president or chancellor. This type of provision is disadvantageous
for the coach because the university president or chancellor is most likely to
side with the athletic director who is a fellow administrator. Additionally,
determining there is just cause for a termination saves the university money
because normally when a coach is terminated the university is absolved of
providing any further compensation and/or collateral benefits. The following
provisions are examples of this second category.
University of South Carolina - Steve Spurrier (Football)
Any termination for cause must be preceded by a pre-termination
meeting held for such purpose by the President of the University after
not less than five (5) days prior written notice to Coach, which notice
shall include a statement of the charges against Coach. The meeting
shall consist of an explanation of the University's cause for
termination and an opportunity for Coach to present his side of the
story. Present at the meeting shall be the President, Athletics Director,
University General Counsel and/or other persons deemed appropriate
by the President. Coach shall be permitted to have an attorney present
to represent him if he so desires. The decision of the President
following the meeting shall be the final University decision.264
Florida State University - Bobby Bowden (Football)
Coach shall have the right, upon written request, for an opportunity for
review and hearing before the President of the University relative to
any termination of this Agreement for Cause. This right shall be
Coach's exclusive opportunity for review and hearing relative to any
termination of this Agreement for Cause and Coach hereby waives his
right to any other hearing provided in the Florida Administrative
Procedures Act, Chapter 120, Florida Statutes, as amended, and in
Chapters 6C and 6C2, Florida Administrative Code. The
determination of the President in such case shall constitute final
agency action.265
263. EMPLOYMENT POLICIES FOR INSTRUCTIONAL AND RESEARCH EPA NON-FACULTY
EMPLOYEES OF THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA AT CHAPEL HILL art. 1V(E)(I-6)-(F) (last
revised July 1, 1999), available at http://www.unc.edu/policies/employmentpolicy.html#IV.
264. EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT BETWEEN THE UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH CAROLINA AND STEVE
SPURRIER § 12.01(b). (Nov. 23, 2004).
265. EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT BETWEEN FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY AND BOBBY BOWDEN §
V(A)(ii)(c) (Nov. 12, 2003).
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Indiana University - Kelvin Sampson (Basketball)
The Employee shall have the procedural right, upon written request, to
a review relating to any such suspension ordered by the Director of
Athletics pending termination.: Such written request shall be sent to
the President of the University. The President may consider this
request or may appoint one or more delegates to consider the request.
The President or his delegate will provide an opportunity to the
Employee to discuss and respond to the reasons set forth as the basis
for the suspension pending termination. If after such opportunity, the
President or his delegate/delegates determine that the recommendation
of the Director of Athletics is proper, the Employee will be notified in
writing of the decision by the President and the termination will take
effect on the date specified in the President's notification. The
President's decision will be final.2 66
University of California, Los Angeles - Ben Howland (Basketball)
In the event of a Termination for Cause, Coach and his counsel shall
be entitled to an opportunity to appear before and/or submit written
materials to the Chancellor or his/her designate in order to test
whether Coach was removed from his position in a manner consistent
with the terms of this 2003 HC Agreement. Such an appearance may
take place either before Coach is removed from his position or after he
is so removed. Coach's request to exercise this right must be made in
writing to the Chancellor. Coach understands and agrees that the
exigencies of operating an NCAA Division I men's basketball
program require that matters involving the termination of Coach for
cause be handled expeditiously to avoid the perception of confusion
within and damage to the program. Coach agrees, therefore, that he
shall have 10 (ten) calendar days from the date on which he receives
notice that he is to be terminated for cause or from the date on which
he is terminated, whichever occurs first, in which to request an
appearance before and/or to submit written materials to the Chancellor
or his/her designate. Such an appearance shall occur within 5 (five)
calendar days after Coach's request to so appear is timely received.
The Chancellor or his/her designate shall review the matter and
respond to Coach in writing within 3 (three) calendar days. The
parties understand and agree that this process represents an
administrative remedy.267
266. SAMPSON CONTRACT, supra note 133, § 6.02(c).
267. EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT BETWEEN THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, Los ANGELES AND
[Vol. 17:1
TERMINATION OF COACHING CONTRACTS
Texas Tech University - Mike Leach (Football)
"Cause" sufficient to satisfy the provisions of this Contract shall be
determined by the President of the University at a pre-termination
meeting held for such purpose after ten (10) days' prior written notice
to Coach, which notice shall include a statement of charges against
Coach. This meeting shall consist of an explanation of the
University's cause for termination and an opportunity for Coach to
present his side of the story. Present at the meeting shall be the
President, Athletics Director, University General Counsel and/or other
persons deemed appropriate by the President, Coach and Coach's
attorney (if Coach so chooses). The decision of the President
following such meeting shall be final. 268
A third category of due process provisions is similar to the process of the
second category. These provisions give the coach the same right to a hearing
in front of the university president; however, the coach first has an opportunity
to appeal to the athletic director. The coach will first appeal to the athletic
director, and then, if the coach is not satisfied with this decision, he or she can
appeal to the president. This third category provides the coach little, if any,
additional protection. Usually the athletic director makes the initial decision
to terminate the coach for cause. The athletic director is highly unlikely to
overturn his or her own decision when the coach appeals. The provisions that
follow are examples of this category of due process provisions.
University of Washington - Lorenzo Romar (Basketball)
Just cause sufficient to satisfy the provisions of this paragraph, shall
initially be determined by the Director. Upon such determination, the
Director shall have the authority to order the paid suspension of
Employee from his duties pending termination of this Agreement,
provided that notice of any such termination shall be delivered to
Employee in writing, detailing the reasons for the termination and
setting forth a reasonable time within which the Employee may
respond. Employee may respond to the Director's notice of
termination in writing or in person. The Director will consider
Employee's response and issue a written decision. If Employee is
dissatisfied with the Director's decision, Employee shall have the
procedural right, upon written request, to a review and an informal
hearing by the Special Assistant to the President relating to any such
BEN HOWLAND § 7(d) (Dec. 18, 2003).
268. EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT BETWEEN TEXAS TECH UNIVERSITY AND MIKE LEACH §
V(A)(8) (Apr. 12, 2004).
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termination ordered by the Director. Any such hearing shall be
governed by state law and shall be held within a reasonable time after
the Director's decision. The Special Assistant to the President will
review the matter and gather additional information as appropriate.
After review, the Special Assistant to the President will notify
Employee and the Director of the decision and the final disposition of
the issue. This right to a hearing by the Special Assistant to the
President shall be in lieu of any right to review that may be provided
for in the Personnel Program.269
Iowa State University - Dan McCamey (Football)
Once the Director of Intercollegiate Athletics has determined
termination is warranted, the Director shall have the administrative
authority to order suspension of McCamey from his duties and salary
pending termination of this Agreement, provided that notice of any
such suspension pending termination shall be delivered to McCarney
in writing, at least three days prior to the effective date of the
suspension, detailing the reasons for such suspension and setting forth
a reasonable time within which McCarney may respond. Within the
three-day period, McCamey shall have the right to an informal
meeting with the Director of Intercollegiate Athletics, or the
Director's designee, to discuss the basis for suspension and
termination. McCarney shall have the procedural right to make a
written request for a review and hearing relating to any such
suspension and termination order by the Director. The request must
be made to the President. The request shall state the grounds for
seeking review. Review and hearing will be before the President or
the President's designee. If a designee conducts the review and
hearing, the designee shall make a recommendation to the President,
who shall make the final decision, subject to any review required by
law or rule. If McCarney fails to request such review and hearing
within five working days after the effective date of the suspension
pending termination, this Agreement shall be terminated for the causes
cited in such notice. 270
Washington State University - Richard Bennett (Basketball)
"Just cause" sufficient to satisfy the provisions of Section 4.2 hereof
269. EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT BETWEEN THE UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON AND LORENZO
ROMAR § 8(e) (Apr. 1, 2002) [hereinafter ROMAR CONTRACT].
270. EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT BETWEEN IOWA STATE UNIVERSITY AND DAN MCCARNEY §
V(2) (Jan. 18, 2003).
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shall initially be determined in good faith by the Athletic Director of
the University. The Athletic Director shall give the Employee written
notice of the provisions of the Agreement alleged to have been
violated, together with a statement of the factual basis for those
allegations. The Employee will have fifteen (15) calendar days within
which to respond to the Athletic Director, in writing, with reasons he
should not be terminated. The Athletic Director, after considering any
response provided by the Employee, will issue a decision regarding
termination for cause. If a summary suspension has been issued in
accordance with paragraph 4.3.1, the Athletic Director must issue a
decision regarding termination within five (5) calendar days of receipt
of the Employee's response. If a summary suspension has not been
ordered, the Athletic Director shall issue a decision regarding
termination within ten (10) calendar days of receipt of the Employee's
response.
Employee's right to receive any payment under this Agreement,
including all portions of Section 3, shall cease the day following the
issuance of the decision to terminate for cause.
The Employee may appeal the Athletic Director's decision to
terminate for cause to the University President or his designee. Such
appeal must be made in writing within fifteen (15) calendar days
notice of the Athletic Director's determination, and must contain a
statement of the reasons that the Employee requests the President to
set aside the decision to terminate for cause. The Employee must
provide a copy of the appeal to the Athletic Director at the time it is
delivered to the Office of the President. The Athletic Director may,
within seven (7) calendar days of receipt of the notice of appeal,
provide an additional written statement supporting his decision to the
President, and shall provide the President with 1) the written notice of
termination sent to the Employee; 2) the Employee's written response,
if any, and 3) the written decision of termination. The President,
within a reasonable time of receiving the notice of appeal and the
documents from the Athletic Director, shall enter a decision regarding
termination for cause. This shall be the final decision of the
University. 271
A fourth category of due process provisions provides the coach the
opportunity to appeal an adverse determination to arbitration. This is a better
271. EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT BETWEEN WASHINGTON STATE UNIVERSITY AND RICHARD
BENNETT §§ 4.2-.3 (May 29, 2003).
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form of due process for the coach because it takes the appeal outside of the
university. At arbitration, the coach has a better opportunity to have an
unbiased hearing. Arbitration also provides for a more finalized decision.
While arbitration decisions can be appealed to the courts for specific statutory
reasons, courts will rarely overturn the decision. The following are examples
of due process clauses providing for arbitration.
University of Iowa - Steve Alford (Basketball)
Coach may challenge University's termination of Coach for cause
before a panel of arbitrators. With respect to alleged violations of
subsections (a), (b), (e) and (f), the issue(s) for determination shall be
whether the violation occurred, with the University bearing the burden
of proof by a preponderance of the evidence.
With respect to alleged violations of subsections (c) and (d), the
issue(s) for determination shall be whether the University can
demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence it had reasonable
grounds to believe it would be subject to the specified sanctions from
the NCAA or Big Ten Conference.
The arbitration panel shall consist of three members, one person
selected by the University, one by Coach, and a third person agreed
upon by the nominees of the parties. In the event the parties are
unable to agree upon a third arbitrator within 14 days, the parties shall
request a list of 10 arbitrators from the American Arbitration
Association selected for their experience in resolving similar disputes.
The parties will select an arbitrator from the list by the "strikedown"
method, with Coach having the first and last strike. The University
will bear all costs of the arbitration, except those relating to the
nominee of Coach and counsel, if any, for Coach .....
The decision of the panel shall be final and binding upon the
parties. 272
Purdue University - Matt Painter (Basketball)
The Coach shall be subject to and have the benefit of all University
grievance procedures which are or which may later become available
to persons holding Administrative/Professional Staff appointments at
the West Lafayette Campus of the University. After the complete
exhaustion of such administrative remedies, the parties agree that all
272. EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT BETWEEN THE UNIVERSITY OF IOWA AND STEVE ALFORD § 10
(Mar. 28, 2004).
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disputes between them arising out of this Agreement or concerning the
scope, interpretation or applicability of any provision of this
Agreement shall be resolved by submission of such dispute to
arbitration according to the rules of the American Arbitration
Association. The arbitrator shall be a member of the National
Academy of Arbitrators and only one arbitrator shall be required. The
decision of the arbitrator shall be final and binding on both the Coach
and the University.273
Georgia Institute of Technology - Chan Gailey (Football)
Should COACH disagree with "good cause" termination, COACH
may, within ten (10) days of such termination, give written notice of
this objection to such termination. In that event, the ASSOCIATION
shall, within a reasonable time, not to exceed twenty (20) days,
request a list of seven arbitrators from the American Arbitration
Association who are available for employment as herein provided.
Selection of an arbitrator shall be made by each party ranking each of
such arbitrators on the list with a number from one (1) to seven (7):
one for the favorite, two for the second, and so on. The two rankings
will be added and the arbitrator with the lowest cumulative number
shall be the arbitrator to hear the case. In the event this method of
selection results in a tie, each party will alternately remove one
arbitrator from the fill list until only one arbitrator remains on the list.
The arbitrator whose name remains on the list shall be the arbitrator
who hears the case. COACH will have the first turn to remove an
arbitrator from the list.
After the selection of an arbitrator, the issue of "good cause"
termination shall be submitted to arbitration for a non-binding
decision which shall be rendered within twenty (20) working days
following the close of the proceedings conducted by the arbitrator.
The proceedings conducted by the arbitrator shall be under such terms
and conditions as the arbitrator determines, consistent with the
procedures of the American Arbitration Association, and the
arbitrator's decision shall be submitted to both parties within twenty
(20) days of the close of evidence and briefs which, within the
discretion of the arbitrator, are allowed.274
The fifth and final category of due process provisions is a miscellaneous
273. PAINTER CONTRACT, supra note 139, § 7.01.
274. EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT BETWEEN THE GEORGIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY AND CHAN
GAILEY art. VIII, § 1 (Dec. 29, 2001).
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category that includes the provisions that do not fit into one of the four
categories already discussed. These provisions are different because they
utilize an unusual form of hearing or provide for a sequence of due process
rights not commonly found in coaches' contracts. The following are examples
of these provisions.
University of Oklahoma - Bob Stoops (Football)
Prior to suspension without pay or termination for cause, or within 30
days after suspension with pay, the President, or his designated
representative, shall provide Coach with a written notice of the
proposed action and a reasonable opportunity to defend. The notice of
proposed action shall state specific grounds and particular facts upon
which the proposed action is based, including any written reports or
documents supporting the proposed action. A reasonable opportunity
to defend shall mean that the Coach shall have a right to meet with the
President, or his designated representative, to respond to the proposed
action. At the meeting, Coach shall be given the opportunity to
present information to refute the existence of legitimate reasons for
the proposed action. To invoke the meeting process, Coach shall
deliver a written request for a meeting to the Director no later than
seven (7) days following receipt of the notice of proposed action.
Upon receipt of Coach's request, the Director shall schedule the
meeting to be held prior to the effective date of the proposed action.
Following the meeting, the proposed action, supporting information,
and the Coach's response and refuting information, if any, shall be
carefully reviewed by the President, or his designated representative,
to decide whether there is a sufficient basis for suspension without pay
or termination. After the review, the President, or his designated
representative, shall render a written decision. If the decision is that
Coach is to be suspended without pay or terminated, the decision shall
include: (1) the reason(s) for suspension without pay or termination,
(2) the facts found and the conclusions drawn from the meeting, and
(3) the effective date of the suspension without pay or termination.
Coach may appeal a written decision for suspension without pay or
termination by filing a written appeal with the Assistant Vice
President for Human Resources within ten (10) working days from the
date of receipt of the written decision. The rules and procedures set
forth in Classified Staff Dispute Resolution Procedure, Policy # 406.0
shall govern the appeal process, except that there shall be no Staff
Dispute Resolution Committee and, in addition to other enumerated
powers, the Hearing Officer shall assume the duties of the Staff
Dispute Resolution Committee and shall make all necessary finding
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and recommendations. For the purposes of this Contract, the rules and
procedures applicable to the appeal process are merely borrowed from
the Classified Staff Human Resources Policy Manual. Nothing herein
shall be construed as classifying Coach, or making Coach a Classified
Staff employee, or conveying to Coach any rights or benefits that are
provided to Classified Staff employees as a result of classification. 275
University of Kansas - Bill Self (Basketball)
Upon receipt of a written request for a hearing, the Chancellor shall
appoint a three-person hearing board, composed of two individuals
from the Board of the University of Kansas Athletic Corporation
("KUAC") and one other University or KUAC employee, to consider
the matter and hear reasons for and against the contemplated action.
Self shall have the right to appear before the hearing board, with a
representative if he desires, to comment on the reasons given for the
contemplated action and present reasons against it. The hearing board
shall not be bound by formal or technical rules of evidence. The
hearing board shall send written findings of fact and recommendations
on the matter to the Chancellor or the Chancellor's designee. The
Chancellor or designee may seek counsel from the KUAC Board. The
Chancellor shall consider and decide the matter and shall notify, in
writing, Self, the Director of Intercollegiate Athletics, and the hearing
board of the Chancellor's decision, which shall be final.2 76
University of Nebraska - Bill Callahan (Football)
(a) If the employment of an athletic staff member is terminated for
cause under this departmental policy, the athletic staff member upon
written request delivered to the Athletic Director shall have the right
to a post-termination hearing within reasonable time after termination
of his or her employment.
(b) The post-termination hearing will be conducted by a panel of
three academic-administrative employees of the University selected by
the Chancellor. Such hearing will be reported by a qualified court
reporter, and a transcript of such hearing shall be prepared, all at the
expense of the University. The athletic staff member shall at his or
her option have the right to have a personal attorney present at such
hearing, to call witnesses on his or her behalf, and to cross-examine
275. EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT BETWEEN THE UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA AND BOB STOOPS §
17 (Jan. 1, 2002).
276. EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT BETWEEN THE UNIVERSITY OF KANSAS AND BILL SELF § I(c)
(Apr. 21, 2003).
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witnesses. The formal rules of evidence applicable in the courts of the
State of Nebraska shall not be applicable in any such hearing,
however, the hearing panel shall only give probative effect to evidence
which possesses probative value commonly accepted by reasonably
prudent persons in the conduct of their affairs. The hearing panel may
exclude incompetent, irrelevant, immaterial and unduly repetitious
evidence.
(c) After the conclusion of the hearing, the hearing panel shall
promptly make a written recommendation for decision of the case to
the Chancellor and provide a copy of such written recommendation to
the athletic staff member. As soon thereafter as possible, the
Chancellor, or his or her designated representative, shall inform the
athletic staff member of the decision of the Chancellor relating to
termination of the athletic staff member's employment. The decision
of the Chancellor shall be final and there may be no further
administrative appeal of such decision within the University of
Nebraska.277
Northwestern University - Randy Walker (Football)
Prior to any contemplated suspension or termination of Employee,
University shall be required to provide Employee with written Notice
of contemplated suspension or termination of employment and a
statement of the reasons and factual basis and support therefor.
Employee, from the date of receipt of said written Notice, shall have
five (5) calendar days from receipt thereof to deliver a written Request
for a hearing on the contemplated action. Written Request shall be
delivered to the office of the Chancellor or President of the University.
If no written request is received by the Chancellor or President as
provided herein, a contemplated suspension termination shall become
final five (5) calendar days following the Employee's receipt of said
Notice. Upon receipt of a written Request for hearing, the Chancellor
or President shall appoint a three (3) person Hearing Panel composed
of the Chief Judge of the County in which the main office of the
University is located, the President of the local Bar Association who
in turn shall select a third arbitrator to consider the matter and hear
reasons for and against the contemplated suspension or termination.
The Employee shall have the right to appear before the Hearing Panel
with a representative, if he desires, including legal representation, to
277. EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT BETWEEN THE UNIVERSITY OF NEBRASKA AND BILL CALLAHAN
§ 7(a)-(c) (July 9, 2004).
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comment on the reasons given for the contemplated action and to
present evidence. The Hearing Panel shall not be bound by formal or
technical rules of evidence but shall be governed by the arbitration
rules of the American Arbitration Association. The decision of the
Hearing Panel shall be final and conclusive as to the employment
status of the Employee. Employee shall be afforded any and all
necessary due process including the right to hire counsel, call
witnesses, conduct discovery, examine documentation and cross
examine witnesses so that Employee is given a fair and unbiased
hearing as to his employment status. The cost of arbitration shall be
borne by the University. 278
When looking at the various categories of due process provisions, it
becomes clear that the questions posed in the beginning of this section can
have many different answers. When discussing the due process rights of
coaches, other issues are important. First, there is the issue of the relationship
between the coach's contract and regular university due process procedures.
Do regular university due process procedures trump those provided for in the
contract, or vice versa? Many contracts answer this question specifically. For
example, Lorenzo Romar's (University of Washington) contract states that
"[t]his right to a hearing by the Special Assistant to the President shall be in
lieu of any right to review that may be provided for in the Personnel
Program." 279 With other contracts, this question is not an issue because the
contract gives the coach the same procedural rights as other university
employees. Randy Edsall's (University of Connecticut) contract is an example
of this.280  His contract provides him with the due process procedures
"currently contained in Article 13 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement
between the University of Connecticut and the University of Connecticut
Chapter, American Association of University Professors." 281
When the coach's contract does not discuss regular university due process
procedures, there is the potential for a conflict. University counsels seem to
agree that they will try to avoid this inconsistency from occurring. However,
there is not a clear consensus about what happens if this conflict does occur.
One general counsel office at a major Division I university states, "we would
do our best to comply with both procedures in the termination."2 82 Another
278. Martin J. Greenberg, College Coaching Contracts Revisited: A Practical Perspective, 12
MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 127, 218-19 (2001).
279. ROMAR CONTRACT, supra note 268, § 8(e).
280. See EDSALL CONTRACT, supra note 257, § 10.1.
281. Id.
282. E-mail from Anonymous University General Counsel Office to Jay S. Smith, Law Student,
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general counsel office from the same conference has a slightly different
opinion. It believes "that the terms and process of the coach's contract would
likely be the ones used. '283 This second general counsel office reasoned that
"[t]he parties bargained for a specific process, even though a more general one
existed.It would not be logical to bargain for a process and then go outside the
contract to use a different process." 284 The differing opinions provided by
these universities are interesting because there is no authority specifying what
procedures should be followed, and it is unclear how courts would resolve this
situation if it arises.
The constitutional right to due process is another issue that can arise when
considering due process for college coaches. First, there is the question of
whether coaches have a constitutional right to due process when terminated.
Secondly, if they are entitled to due process, are the rights they receive
constitutionally adequate?
College coaches at public universities are public employees and as public
employees, they all have a right to pre-removal due process. In Board of
Regents v. Roth,285 the Supreme Court established that public employees are
entitled to pre-removal due process. 286 The Court said, "staff members
dismissed during the terms of their contracts, have interests in [their]
continued employment that are safeguarded by due process. '287 The basic
requirements of due process are "notice and an opportunity to respond."288
More specifically, the Court in Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill289
stated that the "public employee is entitled to oral or written notice of the
charges against him, an explanation of the employer's evidence, and an
opportunity to present his side of the story."290 It is standard for coaches'
contracts to provide them these basic due process rights. All of the due
process provisions quoted earlier provide for these basic rights.
The issue of constitutionally required due process appears to be of limited
importance in college coaches' contracts because it appears that most, if not all
coaches, are afforded the required due process. Public university coaches
under contract are entitled to constitutional due process protections; however,
Marq. Univ. Law School (July 17, 2006, 13:52 CST) (on file with author).
283. E-mail from Anonymous University General Counsel Office to Jay S. Smith, Law Student,
Marq. Univ. Law School (July 26, 2006, 13:23 CST) (on file with author).
284. Id.
285. Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
286. See id.
287. Id. at 577.
288. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546 (1985).
289. Id.
290. Id.
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the due process rights their contracts provide are normally adequate.
Private universities are usually not required to satisfy constitutional due
process requirements when terminating a coach or any other employee.
Generally, private universities are not government actors, and thus, they need
not follow constitutional requirements. However, private universities do
receive some level of public funding, and individuals have attempted to argue
in court that this qualifies private universities as government actors. This
argument has occasionally prevailed in court, but courts have traditionally
been reluctant to accept this position. For example, in Madon v. Long Island
University C. W. Post Center,291 the court held that a tenured professor at a
private university was not entitled to constitutional procedural due process
when he was terminated.292 In finding that public funding was not enough to
qualify the university as a state actor, the court said, "mere allegations of State
financial or other support, without more, are insufficient to convert an
otherwise independent entity into a 'joint venturer' with the State." 293 Based
on this position, coaches at private universities are probably not
constitutionally entitled to procedural due process. However, coaches at
private universities probably have due process rights in their contracts that go
beyond what is constitutionally required.
Considering the issues surrounding due process for college coaches, it is
interesting to note the due process provision in O'Brien's contract. O'Brien's
contract states that "[i]n the event Ohio State terminates this agreement for
cause, Coach shall have such procedural rights and remedies, if any, as are
generally afforded and given to Ohio State administrative and professional
employees." 294 This due process provision provided O'Brien the rights of
other university adminstrative and professional employees, which are found in
The Ohio State University Employee Policy Manual. The policy manual
provides for the following procedure.
B. Upon receipt of a request for suspension or termination, the Office
of Human Resources, Consulting Services, will schedule a pre-
corrective action meeting and notify the staff member and the
supervisor of the date, time, and location. During the meeting, the
supervisor should be prepared to discuss the reasons and the basis for
requesting corrective action. The staff member will have an
opportunity to explain and present evidence as to why action should
not be taken.
291. Madon v. Long Island Univ. C.W. Post Ctr., 518 F. Supp. 246 (E.D.N.Y. 1981).
292. See id.
293. Id. at 249.
294. O'BRIEN CONTRACT, supra note 88, § 5.6.
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C. After the pre-corrective action meeting, the Office of Human
Resources, Consulting Services, will recommend appropriate action
and notify the college/department and staff member of the appointing
authority decision. The appointing authority will issue decisions
within 40 calendar days of the request for corrective action unless
considerable investigation is necessary.
D. CCS staff may appeal the following corrective actions to the State
Personnel Board of Review:
1. Terminations except during the initial probationary period and
for conviction of a felony.
2. Demotions except during the promotional probationary period.
3. Suspensions greater than three days.295
Based on the record in the O'Brien case, it is unclear if any of these
procedures were followed. Regardless of whether the procedures were
followed, they clearly did not prevent the dispute between O'Brien and OSU
from resulting in litigation.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
A. Turnover
In the world of college coaching, coaches are hired to be fired. Their
useful work lives for a particular college are often short term. They live in a
volatile work environment where turnover, job movement and body relocation
is the norm rather than the exception.
295. THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY OFFICE OF HUMAN RESOURCES POLICIES art. 8.15(II)(B-D)
(Apr. 28, 2005), available at http://hr.osu.edu/policy/policy815.pdf.
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NCAA Basketball Coaching Changes NCAA Fonthall Coachintt Chan~es
2005 60* 2005 22*
2004 41* 2004 22*
2003 43* 2003 14*
2002 40* 2002 18*
2001 46* 2001 32*
2000 56** 2000 38**
1999 45** 1999 53**
1998 63** 1998 59**
1997 52** 1997 44**
1996 42** 1996 48*
TOTAL 488 350
Avg. per Year 48.8 35
Total Teams 334 239
Avg. % 14.6% 14.6%
Turnover
*SI.com, USA Today.com
**NCAA statistics
B. Employment Contracts
Employment contracts in college coaching, unlike unionized professional
sports, are not standardized. No two forms are the same. The level of
sophistication by drafters varies. Oftentimes when the coach is ready to sign
the contract, he suffers from job elation; that is, if the salary or package
numbers are acceptable, the contract is executed without advice of counsel.
Coaches' contracts are often created in a frenzy with "invent-the-wheel"
language. 296 The negotiation of coaches' contracts, especially termination
provisions, is a legal specialty that deserves the advice and counsel of an
attorney who understands the nuances and intricacies of termination clauses.
C. Compensation Upon Termination
Whether a coach is terminated for causes enumerated in the contract or for
no cause other than the coach's failure to win or garner alumni support, the
back end of the contract that deals with the financial consequences of
296. Edward Stoner, II & Arlie Nogay, The Model University Coaching Contract ("MCC"): A
Better Starting Point for Your Next Negotiation, 16 J. COLL. & UNIV. L. 43, 44 (1989).
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termination may be as important or more important than the package or
contract salary number.
D. Termination for Cause
Termination for cause provisions usually are drafted to favor the
university.
E. Interpretation
Oftentimes a coach can be fired or terminated for causes that are not
subject to dictionary definition and require legal interpretation, wherein no two
lawyers or even a judge can ultimately agree on the meaning of the terms.
These terms include: 1) conduct seriously prejudicial to the best interests of
the University; 2) moral turpitude; 3) serious or intentional violations of any
rule or regulation; 4) gross negligence in performance; 5) perpetration of
willful fraud; and 6) complicity in an immoral act.
If words are not subject to clear and simple, Webster-style definitions,
they should not be in the contract. Those types of words are used as weapons
to fire or terminate a coach or make the coach resign in order to retain his
honor, which ultimately affects the bottom line. If the contract is going to
have words that are subject to interpretation, then the ultimate finder of fact
must be an impartial party who does not have a vested interest in termination.
F. Due Process
If we are to continue to use words that are subject to interpretation in
termination provisions for a coach's contract, the coach should then be entitled
to a fair process to determine whether cause for termination exists. Procedural
and substantive rights, such as written notice of the factual basis or reasons for
termination, a right to a hearing before an objective and impartial panel, the
right to discovery and cross examination, and the right to be provided with the
protection of counsel, are basic rights that give the coach a more level playing
field when the ultimate determination is made.
G. Dirty Laundry
For many years, dirty laundry was aired in the backroom rather than the
courtroom. There now seems to be a trend where coaches are not afraid to
have their principles adjudicated and to let the court determine whether they
were justly terminated. Termination for cause proceedings usually hang out
the dirty laundry of the university in the public, involve protracted and
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expensive litigation, often offend many loyal fans and alumni and can shed a
negative light on the university, whether it was right or wrong in its
termination decision.
H. System of Termination
Maybe the system of termination needs a further look. Rather than
characterizing termination for cause or not for cause, termination for any
reason should be subject to agreed upon liquidated damages and subject to
mitigation. In that instance, although the coach may be terminated at any
time, at least the coach has the assurances that the agreed upon financial
aspects of the contract will be fulfilled. However, the financial assurances will
be subject to the coach's obligation to continue to find other employment to
mitigate the agreed upon liquidated damages for termination.

